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Antidumping laws were designed to protect domestic industry from
foreign competition. They protect producers at the expense of consum-
ers, which results in higher prices, lower quality products, less consumer
choice and a general lowering of the standard of living for the vast major-
ity of people. Antidumping laws also destroy more jobs than they create.
Part II reviews the theory and practice of antidumping law in the
United States. It looks at the economic and legal background of the area,
the administration of the antidumping laws, and computational problems
involved in arriving at an antidumping decision. It also provides exam-
ples of antidumping investigations in the areas of autos, steel, textiles,
agricultural products, and televisions and discusses the harmful effects of
antidumping policy. It also explores the predatory pricing argument as
applied to antidumping.
Part III discusses some philosophical issues relating to antidumping
law and policy. It views the antidumping laws as a club that can be used
to batter the competition at the expense of consumers and questions the
ethics of using government for this purpose. It also points out the silli-
* Robert W. McGee is a professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall
University in South Orange, New Jersey.
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ness of antidumping policy, since it in effect protects consumers from low
prices, and develops a rights-based argument against antidumping laws.
Part IV concludes that antidumping laws are harmful, serve no use-
ful purpose and should be repealed, the sooner the better.
II. ANTIDUMPING POLICY IN THE USA: THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. Economic and Legal Background
Antidumping laws have been on the books in the United States, in
one form or another, for decades. Perhaps the first major antidumping
law in the United States was included in the Revenue Act of 1916,1
which is sometimes referred to as the Antidumping Duty Act of 1916.2
This law was passed in response to alleged German predatory dumping
during the First World War,3 and made it a crime to import foreign
products for prices that were less than wholesale or actual market value.4
Since it was a criminal statute, perpetrators could be found guilty only
upon a finding that there was an intent to harm or destroy an industry in
the United States or to prevent such an industry from being formed.
Although this law has not yet been repealed, it was not used much
until Zenith and National Union Electric Corporation filed charges
against Japanese television manufacturers in 1974.' The prohibition por-
tion of the Act reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any
articles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and
systematically to import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles
within the United States at a price substantially less than the actual market
value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to the
United States, in the principal markets of the country of their production,
1 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 800-801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72). Richard
Dale points out that the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act of
1894 could have been applied to dumping situations. See RicHARD DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN
A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 12 (1980).
2 Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX.
INT'L L. J. 265, 268 (1987).
3 RicHARD DALE, supra note 1, at 12. Also see JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 242-46 (1923; 1966).
4 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
5 This is pointed out in Note, Managing Dumping in a Global Economy, 21 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. at 511, n. 50 (1988). The case in question was Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1981), 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir., 1983), 475 U.S.
574 (1986). Michael S. Knoll states that there was only one, unsuccessful, prosecution under the
1916 Act for the first fifty years. See Knoll, supra note 2, at 268, n. 22. A. Paul Victor gives a
history of prosecutions under this Act and reviews the relationship between the U.S. antitrust and
antidumping laws. See A. Paul Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies Be Re-
solved? 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 339-50 (1983).
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or of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported after
adding to such market value or wholesale price, freight, duty, and other
charges and expenses necessarily incident to the importation and sale
thereof in the United States: Provided, That such act or acts be done with
the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of
preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of re-
straining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles
in the United States.
6
Because this law is a criminal statute, it has a penalty provision.
That provision reads as follows:
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to
violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of,
or combination or conspiracy to violate, this section, may sue therefor in
the district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover threefold the damafes sustained, and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Because the Antidumping Duty Act of 1916 was a criminal statute
and had an intent requirement, it was difficult to convict anyone of
dumping. Thus, the need was seen for another antidumping law, civil
in nature, that would lower the level of proof needed to convict. The
Antidumping Act of 1921 was passed to fit this purpose.8 Curiously,
though, the various Congressional hearings and investigations that were
held at this time were unable to uncover much dumping.
In all the hearings that we had before the Committee on Finance there was
not in any instance any showing of any dumping of foreign goods into this
country... The price of almost every manufactured commodity is so much
higher in the United States than anywhere else in the world that it is not
necessary for the exporter from a foreign country to export it into this
country at a less price than the same article is sold for in the markets of the
producing country. 9
The Antidumping Act of 1921 is conceptually and institutionally
similar to present-day antidumping law. 10 For example, it established
the sanction of an offsetting duty that is equal to the adjusted price differ-
ential of the goods that are dumped and a two-pronged legal process
6 15 U.S.C. § 72 (Emphasis in original).
7 Id.
8 Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-10, 42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-171).
9 Congressional Record, May 4, 1921, p. 1021, quoted in JAMEs BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE
FRAUD 113 (1991).
10 Knoll, supra note 2, at 269.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:491(1993)
whereby one government agency (originally the Treasury Department
but now the Department of Commerce) decided whether a product was
being dumped and another government agency (originally the Tariff
Commission but now the United States International Trade Commission)
decided whether the dumping caused injury." Foreign manufacturers
could not sell their products in the United States for less than fair value,
which was defined as the price charged for the product in the home mar-
ket. If a domestic industry was materially injured by the sale by the
foreign company, the import was subjected to a duty that was equal to
the difference between the price charged in the United States and the
foreign market value of the product. For example, if the product sold in
the foreign country for $10 and in the United States for $7, the duty
would be $3. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was subsequently amended
by the Trade Act of 1974,12 which was later superseded by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979.11
The Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff;' 4
affected trade in a different way, by placing penalties on foreign produ-
cers who received export subsidies from their governments. The Smoot-
Hawley Tariff is generally recognized as deepening the depression in the
United States by closing off the U.S. borders to foreign trade and causing
other countries to retaliate by raising trade barriers of their own.15 U.S.
foreign trade dropped by more than fifty percent the year after the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff was passed. 6 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
added sections 731-740 to the Tariff Act of 1930. Most provisions of the
Antidumping Act of 1921 were later merged into the Tariff Act of 1930
as well. 1
7
Antidumping investigations became relatively infrequent after pas-
sage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Between the be-
ginning of 1934 and October 1, 1954, only 146 dumping cases were
brought against foreign companies, and only seven of them resulted in
the imposition of dumping duties. In the next twenty-seven months, only
one of the fifty-two cases the Treasury examined found both dumping
11 Id
12 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
13 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193. (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673i, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-1673i (1980 & 1992 Supp.)).
14 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
15 HANS F. SENNHoLz, AGE OF INFLATION 52, 128 (1979); MuRRAY N. ROTHBARD,
AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION 213-15 (1963; 1972); CHRISTIAN SAINT-ETIENNE, THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 1929-1938: LESSONS FOR THE 1980s 29 (1984).
16 JAMES BOVARD, THE FARM FIAsco 23 (1989).
17 See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.at 60-61, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 446-47.
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and injury.18
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 incorporated the 1930 Tariff
Act's dumping provisions and extensively amended the antidumping law
in an attempt to improve its application and procedures.19 It took effect
January 1, 1980, the same day the GATT Antidumping Code entered
into force in the USA.20 The one major change brought about by the
1979 Act was the addition of an injury test21 for countervailing duty
cases. To determine whether an investigation should proceed, the ITC
looks to see whether there is a reasonable indication that an industry in
the United States (1) is materially injured, or (2) is threatened with mate-
rial injury, or (3) if the establishment of an industry in the United States
is materially retarded by imports. If not, the investigation is
terminated.22
Previously, subsidized imports were subject to a countervailing duty
automatically. But since the passage of the 1979 Act, countries are enti-
tled to an injury test23 for subsidized imports if they signed the GATT
Subsidies Code or subscribe to rules equivalent to those of GATT.
Countries that do not fall into this category are still subject to a counter-
vailing duty automatically.24 A minor revision brought about by the
1979 Act resulted in giving domestic industries a greater interest in ad-
ministrative procedures and increased court access.25
The present antidumping law in the United States is based on the
1979 Act, with minor modifications, the most important of which is a
1984 amendment that requires injuries to be assessed by cumulating im-
ports from competing countries that are subject to investigation.26 Ever
since 1967, when a number of industrial countries signed the Antidump-
ing Code27 as part of the Kennedy Round of GATT, the United States
has enacted numerous trade laws and regulations aimed at preserving
18 BovARD, supra note 9, at 114.
19 Note, supra note 5, at 512.
20 Id at 513, n. 64.
21 For a discussion of the injury test as applied to actual antidumping and countervailing duty
cases between 1980 and 1984, see A. Paul Victor, Injury Determinations by the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 749 (1984).
22 19 U.S.C.A. 1671b(a) (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
23 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
24 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1980 & 1992 Supp.); Knoll, supra note 2, at 269 and n.29.
25 Knoll, supra note 2, at 269; Victor, supra note 5, at 347-48.
26 Knoll, supra note 2, at 269-70 and n. 31.
27 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, June 30, 1967, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. 4348, 4348-49.
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"fair" competition or protecting various domestic industries from "un-
fair" competition.
The government's attitude toward dumping has grown more protec-
tionist in recent years. The 1979 revision to the antidumping laws made
them more protectionist and Congress shifted the administration of the
antidumping laws from the Treasury Department to the Commerce De-
partment mainly because it wanted to see foreign companies get hit with
more dumping penalties.2"
B. Administration of the Antidumping Laws
Imagine a system of civil litigation in which a party serves a massive
discovery request, consisting of interrogatories and requests for produc-
tion of documents. Imagine further that the serving party has the sole
authority to prescribe the time within which response must be made and
the format (such as to require multiple copies and translation into Eng-
lish of all requested documents originally prepared in a foreign lan-
guage). Imagine still further that the serving party is the sole judge of
the adequacy of the response and of the merits of all objections as to
relevancy or burdensomeness of the request; that the serving party also is
the imposer of sanctions for failure to comply, and the ultimate decision-
maker in the underlying matter for which the information is sought.
Such a system would be intolerable in the state or federal courts of
the United States. It would raise serious questions of due process in a
system of administrative law that separates the investigative from the ju-
dicial function within a single agency. But this is the inquisitorial system
that was ordained by Congress for the administration of the antidumping
and countervailing duty provisions of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Torquemada, no doubt, would be right at home with it. But this is hardly
a recommendation for the system. It should be changed.29
One problem with the present system is the short period of time in
which to conduct and complete the investigation. The law calls for the
Commerce Department to make a preliminary determination within 160
days from the time the petition is filed and to reach a final determination
seventy-five days after that, for a total of 235 days from the date the
petition is filed until the matter is finally determined.30 The Commerce
Department may extend a preliminary antidumping investigation for fifty
more days and the final determination for sixty days, under certain
28 BovARnD, supra note 9, at 114.
29 N. David Palmeter, Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again, 20 INT'L
LAW. 641, 641 (1986).
30 1930 Tariff Act, §§ 733 and 735, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
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circumstances.31
That might be sufficient time if the Commerce Department just
asked for a few bits of basic information, and the short time deadlines
would speed up the process. But it demands much more than just a few
pieces of information. The standard questionnaire demands information
covering all U.S. sales as well as sales in the company's home market for
a six month period. The data must be in a mandatory computer tape
format. It will accept only IBM-compatible computer tapes. 2 Much of
what it demands is not useful, but is demanded so as to avoid criticism
from the petitioner for not being thorough enough. 3 If the target of the
investigation thinks that the requirements being imposed by the Com-
merce Department are too onerous, there is no effective appeal, because
the Commerce Department determines what is enough, when it should
be presented and in what format it should be presented. Of course, the
target company can go to the Court of International Trade,34 but that is
costly and time-consuming, and the Commerce Department can exclude
any information the target company wishes to present as not being in
conformity with its own administrative requirements.3"
But the time element is not the main problem. It is the way the
Commerce Department administers the antidumping laws, especially the
demands for data that it places on foreign producers, which is sometimes
unreasonable. In one case, it imposed a 115.82% dumping duty on ura-
nium imports from six republics of the former Soviet Union.36 The
prices the Commerce Department looked at were from the period before
31 The procedure actually can be a bit more complicated than that, and the final determination
by the U.S. International Trade Commission may be made as late as 420 days after the petition is
filed. For the specifics, see U.S. International Trade Commission, SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PRO-
VISIONS RELATED TO IMPORT RELIEF 8-16 (Washington: U.S. International Trade Commission, no
date).
32 Palmeter, Torquemada and the Tariff Act, supra note 29, at 644.
33 Id. at 646.
34 At least one commentator has called for the abolition of the Court of International Trade
because the multilayer review process that results from its existence is too time consuming and
costly. He suggests its duties can be just as well performed by administrative law judges, and regular
district courts, with appellate review. See Kevin C. Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. Court of
International Trade, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 13-37 (1985).
35 Palmeter, supra note 29, at 646-47.
36 James Bovard, US. Protectionists Claim a Russian Victim, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1992, at A-
10, col. 3. For more on the antidumping Investigation that was filed in November, 1991 against
Soviet uranium importers by U.S. mining interests, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Uranium
Enrichmentr Unresolved Trade Issues Leave Uncertain Future for U.S. Uranium Industry, GAO/
RCED-92-194, June 19, 1992; U.S. International Trade Commission, Uranium from the U.S.S.R.,
Investigation 731-TA-539, Pub. No. 2471, December, 1991.
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these republics came into existence.37 In effect, they were being punished
for Soviet pricing behavior.
As part of its investigation, the Commerce Department sent the six
governments a sixty-six page questionnaire - in English, of course -
that demanded detailed information regarding their uranium operations.
It violated U.S. law by failing to provide them with copies of the full
petitions that were filed by the domestic producers and a labor union that
initiated the proceedings. The six CIS countries were found guilty of
dumping because they failed to provide the thousands of pages of docu-
mentation demanded. The information could have been obtained, theo-
retically, from the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry.
However, that ministry was abolished a few months previously, and
much of the information would have been top secret anyway.
The Commerce Department arrived at the 115% figure by taking
some unsubstantiated numbers offered by the parties who filed the peti-
tion, and determining what their costs would have been if they had used
Portuguese electricity, Namibian labor costs, and performed the work
with Canadian efficiency. In arriving at its calculation, the Commerce
Department assumed that, since Canadian uranium miners are four
times as efficient as Czech miners, and since Czechoslovakia is also a
nonmarket economy, then CIS miners must be only twenty-five percent
as efficient as Canadian miners. Thus, they require four times as much
labor, so the Commerce Department computed CIS labor costs accord-
ingly. Bovard estimates that keeping uranium from CIS countries out of
the United States will cost the fifty million American consumers of nu-
clear power up to $300 million more a year for electricity. 8
The information demanded (not requested) by the Commerce De-
partment can be overly burdensome. And companies that refuse to sup-
ply it do so at their own risk, since the Commerce Department has no
qualms about pulling numbers out of the air to construct estimated
figures if the company involved will not provide them. The average an-
tidumping questionnaire is more than seventy pages long, single spaced.
Companies have forty-five to sixty days to reply. But before they can
reply, they must translate the questionnaire into their language, dis-
tribute it to numerous company employees who will be working on vari-
ous aspects of the questionnaire, determine what information has to be
37 U.S. International Trade Commission, URANIUM FROM THE U.S.S.R., Pub. No. 2471,
December, 1991.
38 James Bovard, US. Protectionists Claim a Russian Victim, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1992, at A-
10, col. 5. Some of this information is also reported in the 56 Fed. Reg. 63711-63712 (1991), repro-
duced in U.S. International Trade Commission, Uranium from the U.S.S.R., Pub. No. 2471, Decem-
ber, 1991 at B-5-6.
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reported, then gather it, read and digest it. It is only then that they will
be able to respond to the Commerce Department's demands for data.39
The Commerce Department can demand practically an infinite
amount of information - and any refusal to comply is taken as a confes-
sion of guilt, after which it imposes the highest possible dumping mar-
gins. The Commerce Department collects vast amounts of confidential
information from foreign businesses and has frequently allowed this in-
formation to fall into the hands of American competitors.'
Matsushita withdrew from an antidumping case involving small
business telephone systems, 41 thereby abandoning more than $50 million
in export sales, because of the onerous requirements imposed by the
Commerce Department.42 On a Friday afternoon, it received a demand
by the Commerce Department to translate 3,000 pages of Japanese finan-
cial documents into English by the following Monday morning.
If the company in question does not provide the information the
Commerce Department wants, the Commerce Department will construct
the numbers it needs, using the "best information available" (BIA).43
But in many cases, this information is not very close to what the actual
numbers would have been. In many cases, the Commerce Department
uses data that is provided by the very companies that filed the petition,
which means it has a high probability of being biased against the foreign
producer. In fact, because of the way the Commerce Department can
construct imaginary prices, it is entirely possible that it can find dumping
even when prices are the same worldwide.44
The Commerce Department placed a particularly onerous and bur-
densome reporting requirement on SKF, a Swedish bearings manufac-
turer. Commerce demanded, and SKF supplied, information on more
than 100 million separate sales. The first submission weighed three tons,
was more than 150,000 pages in length, and included more than 4 billion
pieces of information. 45 As might be expected, there were a few mistakes
in the data, which the company put together in about a week, the amount
of time the Commerce Department gave it to respond. About one per-
cent of the data from its German sales were in a form that was not suita-
ble to the Commerce Department, so it ignored all the data the company
39 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 135.
40 James Bovard, No Justice in Anti-Dumping, N.Y. Times, January 28, 1990, at F13, col. 2.
41 Investigation 731-TA-426. Listed in I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE PoLrrics 393 (2d
ed. 1992).
42 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 136.
43 Tariff Act of 1930, § 776, 19 U.S.C. 1677e (1980 & 1992 Supp.).
44 Knoll, supra note 2, at 280.
45 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 137.
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supplied and worked up its own numbers, using the best information
available. The result was a 180% dumping margin.
Another criticism that can be made of the way the Commerce De-
partment administers the antidumping laws is the way it determines what
data to use to compute a dumping margin. It usually examines just the
data for the larger companies, and uses that data to determine what the
dumping duty should be for smaller companies in the same country."
These small companies can defend themselves by offering information on
their own costs, but the Commerce Department does not have to con-
sider these responses and can reject this information for any reason. In
an action filed by the National Knitwear and Sportswear Association
against Hong Kong sweater manufacturers, hundreds of Hong Kong
companies were assessed a 5.86% duty because one company earned less
than eight percent. 7 Some small companies in Taiwan have also felt the
wrath of the Commerce Department because they were not able to sup-
ply the information required. In one case, the Commerce Department
demanded that the companies respond to a 100-page questionnaire, writ-
ten in English, that required more than 200,000 pieces of information.
The management of one of these companies consisted of a husband and
wife team, but the Commerce Department found that lack of sufficient
management was no excuse for not responding to the questionnaire.48
The Commerce Department imposed a duty on another Taiwanese com-
pany because it did not supply information. The fact that its factory had
burned down and its records destroyed was not a sufficient excuse for
failure to provide information. As a result of these and other cases, many
Taiwanese sweaters now have a 21.94% dumping duty which, coupled
with a thirty-four percent tariff, makes it very difficult, if not impossible,
for Taiwanese sweater manufacturers to compete in the U.S. market.
Within a year after the Commerce Department started its investigation
of the Taiwanese acrylic sweater industry, more than two-thirds of the
Taiwanese companies that produce acrylic sweaters went out of busi-
ness.49 As a result of the investigation, the United States imported forty
million fewer acrylic sweaters from Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong in
1990 than in 1989.
Another criticism that has been made of the way in which the an-
46 Id. at 138.
47 Id. at 138-39. Listed in I.M. DESTLER, supra note 41, at 396. Investigation 731-TA-448,
filed September 22, 1989. More information on this Investigation may be found in U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, SWEATERS, Pub. No. 2312 (1990) and SWEATERS (HONG KONG,
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TAIWAN), Pub. No. 2311 (1990).
48 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 139.
49 Id. at 155.
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tidumping law is administered has to do with the fact that it is adminis-
tered both by the Commerce Department and the United States
International Trade Commission. Sometimes there is a dispute about
which agency is to do what.50 The Tariff Act bifurcated, or split, the
duties for administering the antidumping law between these two agen-
cies. The Commerce Department initiates antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations, determines whether there has been dumping
or subsidization, and publishes whatever orders result. The ITC deter-
mines whether a domestic industry has been materially injured or
threatened with injury, or whether the growth of a domestic industry is
being materially retarded. But which agency has the authority to decide
whether a petitioner has standing to petition for relief.? This issue is by
no means clear, and comes up when it comes time to decide whether an
investigation should be terminated for lack of standing.51
C. Computational Problems
There are a number of problems with the way that dumping duties
are computed. Many of the computations the Commerce Department
uses violate generally accepted accounting principles, the principles com-
panies have to use with their published financial statements. But the gov-
ernment does not have to follow generally accepted accounting
principles, since these rules are promulgated by private groups, such as
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. Some of the computations the Commerce
Department uses to arrive at a dumping decision violate common sense
as well. Below is a discussion of some of the major problems.
1. Shifts in Exchange Rates
In order to compare the foreign price with the domestic price, the
foreign price has to be converted into dollars. The method used to make
this conversion sometimes results in a charge of dumping.52 And it is a
problem that cannot be avoided by the foreign seller because exchange
50 For example, see Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 241 (Fed. Cir), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989).
51 At least two commentators take the position that the Commerce Department has the sole
statutory power to make standing determinations. See Edwin J. Madaj and Charles H. Nails, Bifur-
cation Without Direction: The United States International Trade Commission and the Question of
Petitioner Standing in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 22 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
673-88 (1991). Curiously, both authors of this article are employees of the U.S. International Trade
Commission.
52 For more on this point, see N. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and Antidumping Determina-
tions, 22 J. WoRL)D TRADE 73 (1988).
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rates cannot be predicted in advance, and even if they could, it would not
always be possible to avoid a charge of dumping, as we shall see shortly.
Let's take the case of the German Mark. If the exchange rate at the
time the contract is signed is DM2.0 equals $1 and the price of the prod-
uct in Germany is DM2.0 and in the United States is $1.00, then there is
no dumping because the product sells in each market for the same price.
But if the price of the Deutsche Mark appreciates against the dollar to
1.6, then there is dumping because the product then sells on the German
market for DM2.0, which is now the equivalent of $1.25, which is $0.25
higher than the price in the United States. Thus, it appears that the Ger-
man company is selling in the United States for a lower price than on the
German market. 53
In 1989, General Chemical de Puerto Rico, Inc. initiated an an-
tidumping suit against a Venezuelan company for exporting aluminum
sulfate to the United States for less than fair value.54 A weighted average
dumping margin of 259.17% was arrived at by using the official ex-
change rate of 14.5 bolivares to the dollar rather than the 39.5 free mar-
ket rate. In effect, the Venezuelan government's unrealistic exchange rate
policy led to the expulsion from the United States of one of its compa-
nies. But that is not to say that the Commerce Department was justified
in what it did, because it should not have used the official exchange rate
anyway, since it deviated so drastically from the market rate.
Companies in countries that have hyperinflation can be especially
hard hit by the Commerce Department's methodology.55 In one dump-
ing case involving a Brazilian company that made steel wheels, the Com-
merce Department computed the selling price in the United States using
the exchange rate in effect at the sale date, but based the company's cost
of production on the rate that existed when the product was exported,
several months later.56 Such methodology can result in a major distortion
when the exchange rate declines rapidly as a result of hyperinflation.
What seems unfair about the Commerce Department's methodology
is that foreign companies can be hit with a dumping charge even if there
was no intent to dump. The number of dumping cases can increase if the
Federal Reserve Board takes actions that result in driving down the
value of the dollar in comparison to other currencies. In effect, the Com-
53 If 1.6DM =$1, then 1.0DM =$0.625 [1.0/1.6] and 2.0DM = $1.25 [2 x $0.625].
54 Aluminum Sulfate from Venezuela. USITC Pub. 2242. Inv. No. 731-TA-431 (Dec. 1989).
See also BOVARD, supra note 9, at 116-17; DESTLER, supra note 41, at 394.
55 See Gilbert B. Kaplan, Lynn G. Kamarck and Marie Parker, Cost Analysis under the An-
tidumping Law, 21 GEo. WASH. I. INT'L L. & ECON. 357, 409-10 (1988) (suggesting a different
methodology would be more appropriate where there is hyperinflation).
56 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 117.
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merce Department has delegated the exchange rate determination to the
Federal Reserve Bank, a private organization (nominally, at least).57
And the Commerce Department adjusts its exchange rates only once
each quarter, so the rates it uses may be much different than those actu-
ally used in the marketplace. And if companies purchase currency fu-
tures contracts to protect themselves against fluctuations in exchange
rates, the Commerce Department may impute a foreign exchange loss
even though no loss has occurred.5" As a result, price comparisons can be
distorted. This was the result in the case brought by the Floral Trade
Council against a fresh cut flower exporter from Colombia.59
N. David Palmeter points out an inherent flaw in the Commerce
Department's methodology:
... [Tihe main problem... [is that] the regulation requires conversion from
foreign currency into U.S. dollars, rather than vice versa. Conversion into
dollars is necessary for valuation purposes, but it makes no sense in an-
tidumping proceedings....
Theoretically, if the proper exchange rate is chosen, the result
should be the same, but in practice it rarely, if ever, is chosen: in the real
world it rarely, if ever, can be chosen. One problem lies in the notion
that any single exchange rate will permit an accurate dollar-to-dollar
comparison. Elements of the dollar-denominated export price, such as
insurance and freight, are normally incurred in the exporter's currency,
and consequently must also be converted into dollars. However, these
items are likely to be contracted and paid for some time after the sales
agreement for the exported merchandise. The Department's regulation
calls for use of a single conversion rate for all elements of the transaction,
i.e. the one in effect the day the exported merchandise was sold. Because
a different rate was probably in effect on the day arrangements were
made for insurance and freight, the practice is inherently distortive.
Even if this frequent problem is not present in a particular case,
realistically it is not possible for the rate determined by the Federal Re-
serve to be the "proper" rate in any event; consequently, the claim that
use of a proper rate prevents distortion collapses in the face of reality.1
57 See Palmeter, supra note 52, at 75 (raising the point that the Commerce Dept. uses exchange
rates as determined by the Federal Reserve Bank). The present author was unable to find anything
in the literature that explores the legality of the Commerce Department's delegation of authority to
the Federal Reserve Bank. An exploration of this issue would make an interesting article.
58 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 118.
59 Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Israel,
Kenya, Mexico, The Netherlands, and Peru, USITC Pub. 1877, Inv. No. 731-TA-327-334 (July
1986) (hereinafter "Certain Fresh Cut Flowers"); See aso BovARD, supra note 9, at 118; DESTLER,
supra note 41.
60 Palmeter, supra note 52, at 75-77 (citations omitted).
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The Commerce Department departs from the quarterly rate only if
there is a fluctuation of five percent or more between the daily rate and
the preset quarterly rate. But in order to be liable for a dumping penalty,
a company's price need be only 0.5% lower than the home market price,
or one-tenth the exchange rate fluctuation. So it is possible for the Com-
merce Department to find that a product has been dumped solely on the
basis of its exchange rate computation, which is not sufficiently precise,
given the narrow acceptability band used to determine the presence or
absence of dumping.61
The courts have had problems with the Commerce Department's
exchange rate methodology. It is not reasonable for Commerce to find
dumping by a firm with only ten relevant home market sales during the
period of the investigation solely because of Commerce's use of quarterly
exchange rates. In this case the purpose of the antidumping laws would
be violated if Commerce found a dumping margin based on the use of
quarterly rates, while no margin would result if Commerce were to use
the rates prevailing at the time of transactions.62
A more equitable approach would be to ignore price differentials
that result merely from exchange rate fluctuations.
2. Computing the Cost of Production
In 1974, Congress added a cost of production test to determine
whether dumping was taking place. For the first few years, this test was
seldom used, but its use increased since 1980, when the Commerce De-
partment took over the responsibility for investigating dumping allega-
tions. Now, about two-thirds of all dumping investigations involve
looking into a company's cost of production or constructing value analy-
ses.63 The Commerce Department allows a foreign company to charge a
price that is high enough to cover its cost of production plus allow for a
"reasonable profit," which it considers to be eight percent.6 Companies
that charge this price are considered to be charging a fair price. Any-
thing less is considered unfair. Interestingly enough, many American
companies do not make an eight percent profit, and would feel lucky if
they could. To arrive at this fair price, the Commerce Department be-
gins by estimating the material production cost, 65 then it adds ten per-
61 Id. at 77.
62 Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori Instrumenti Musicali and Enzo Pizza, Inc. v. United
States, 640 F. Supp. 255, 260-61 (CIT 1986), aff'd, 645 F. Supp. 956 (CIT 1986).
63 Kaplan, Kanarck and Parker, supra note 55, at 358.
64 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(ii) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
65 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(1)(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
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cent for administrative overhead.66 The Commerce Department will not
penalize companies that have an administrative overhead of more than
ten percent, but if it is less than ten percent, they could be in trouble. In
effect, the more efficient a company is, the greater its chances of being
penalized for keeping its administrative overhead low.67
After adding ten percent for administrative overhead, it adds an
eight percent profit margin.6 It then adds the cost of all containers and
coverings of whatever nature, and all other expenses that are incidental
to placing the product in condition, packed ready for shipment to the
United States.69 If the resulting total is higher than the price the com-
pany actually charges for its product in the United States, it will be pun-
ished for selling at a loss. Companies that charge a lower price are
considered to be selling at lower than production cost. So if a company
makes a six percent profit, the Commerce Department considers it to be
incurring a two percent loss.
This methodology can be criticized on several counts. For one
thing, the ten percent overhead allocation is totally arbitrary and has
nothing to do with the overhead cost a particular company might incur.
Ironically, companies that have an overhead of significantly more than
ten percent might actually be selling at a loss in the U.S. market,
although the Commerce Department figure might show them making a
profit. And companies that keep their overhead low are penalized for
being efficient. And the Commerce Department will ignore the evidence
if a company attempts to show that it is actually making a profit if the
Commerce Department's computations show that it is taking a loss.7 0
The eight percent profit requirement also can be criticized on several
counts. For one thing, it is totally arbitrary. Profit margins are different
for different industries, yet the Commerce Department does not take that
into account. Many of the top American companies listed in the Fortune
500 do not make that high a return. The Big-three automakers often
make a negative return, in the sense that they lose hundreds of millions
or even billions of dollars in some quarters.
The Commerce Department uses several questionable accounting
techniques as well, which sometimes result in inflating a foreign com-
pany's cost of production. For example, if a foreign company is able to
reduce its labor costs by using part-time labor for the product being in-
66 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(i) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
67 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 126.
68 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(1)(B)(ii) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
69 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(e)(1)(C) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
70 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 127.
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vestigated, the Commerce Department might decide to compute the
company's labor cost by using a company-wide weighted-average labor
cost, which tends to inflate the labor cost figure.7" In effect, companies
are penalized for cutting their costs by using part-time labor if the Com-
merce Department thinks they are using too much of it.
The method the Commerce Department uses to compute produc-
tion costs in agriculture also is much different from the method an ac-
counting firm would use. Rather than averaging such costs, it computes
production cost by using the costs incurred in a single year. Its rationale
is that yields are unpredictable and depend on many variables.72
Its costing methods are far from scientific. It determined the pro-
duction cost for red raspberries by taking a random sample of ten Cana-
dian farmers.73 But an International Trade Commission study found
that raspberry production costs for U.S. farmers varied by nearly 100%.
Part of the wide variance depended on how the farmer financed the busi-
ness. Mortgage interest was included in the cost of production if the
farm had a mortgage. But if there was no mortgage, interest would not
be imputed on the farm property. Because of this inconsistent practice,
two farmers, selling raspberries for the same price, could wind up with
different results from a Commerce Department investigation. The
farmer with the mortgage could get hit with a dumping charge, while the
farmer without a mortgage, and therefore with lower production costs,
would not be liable for dumping. But if they sell their raspberries for the
same price, how can it be said that one is selling at a fair price and the
other is not?
The Commerce Department also artificially boosts the farmers' cost
of production by imputing wages that are never paid. Farmers don't
earn anything until the end of the season. Their income consists of
whatever they have left after paying expenses. But the Commerce De-
partment imputes a wage expense to them anyway - the farmer plus
family members - then adds a ten percent overhead figure and an eight
percent profit.7 4 This methodology raises their production cost, on pa-
per, and enhances the possibility that they will be found guilty of dump-
ing, since the definition of dumping is selling for less than the cost of
production plus an eight percent profit.
The Commerce Department sometimes includes other unlikely
71 Kaplan, Kamarck and Parker, supra note 55, at 394.
72 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 128.
73 Red Raspberries from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 19,768 (Dep't Comm. 1992), reported in BO-
YARD, supra note 9, at 128 and 164 n. 89.
74 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 128-29.
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items into the cost of production. For example, it included Suzuki's
costs of defending itself against charges by the U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission that it made unsafe all-terrain vehicles. And it in-
cluded in production costs the donations that two Korean sweater manu-
facturers75 made to local charities, claiming that it was part of the cost of
making sweaters.76 Any CPA who made such classifications could be
sued for malpractice.
Another problem with the Commerce Department's methodology is
that it is not consistent. Its cost accounting has been known to shift from
case to case, and even within the same investigation. When it investi-
gated some Brazilian companies, it used more than ten different ap-
proaches to measure their cost of production.7 7 A problem with using so
many different methods is that the company trying to avoid a dumping
change never knows in advance which method will be used, which makes
it difficult to plan. Even if the company uses one of the cost accounting
methods that the Commerce Department uses, it may still have to defend
itself because the Commerce Department investigator decides to use a
different method for that particular investigation.78
Another flaw in the Commerce Department's methodology is that it
sometimes compares the cost of production for one period with the price
charged in another period. For example, in one semiconductor case, it
compared the sales price currently being charged with cost of production
figures for semiconductors that were made three months previously.79
For some industries, a three-month lag would not be significant, but for
the semiconductor industry, it was, because the cost of production de-
clined rapidly for the period being investigated. Between 1984 and 1985,
the average variable cost of producing semiconductors dropped by sixty-
six percent from $8.0313 to $2.7376. And from 1985 to 1986, the costs
were estimated to drop by another fifty-two percent, from $2.7376 to
$1.2989." 0 Thus, the cost of production was substantially overstated,
thereby enhancing the probability that the company in question would be
found guilty of dumping for selling below production cost (plus eight
percent).
A further criticism of the Commerce Department's cost of produc-
75 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, The Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. No. 731-TA-448-450 (Sept. 1990) (hereinafter "Sweat-
ers"), reported in DESTLER, supra note 41, at 396.
76 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 129.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 130.
80 IaL
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tion methodology is its emphasis on total costs rather than variable costs.
For a particular project, companies measure whether they can make a
profit by comparing the selling price (variable revenue) to variable cost
(the cost of making one additional unit). Production and sale decisions
are made on the basis of variable data. But the Commerce Department
measures profit for a particular project on the basis of total cost, which
includes both fixed and variable cost. Yet companies ignore fixed costs
when they compute the viability of making their next sale, because fixed
costs will remain constant regardless of which decision they make, and
are therefore irrelevant to the outcome of the decision.
For example, if a company's fixed costs are $100 million a year, and
it is faced with the decision of whether to sell an additional 100 units of
product at five dollars each, it will decide to make the sale if its variable
unit cost is four dollars, and it will decide not to sell if its variable unit
cost (the cost to make an additional unit) is seven dollars. The fact that
its fixed cost is $100 million is irrelevant as far as the sell/not sell deci-
sion is concerned. Of course, over the long-run, all fixed costs must be
recouped, but fixed costs are ignored when making decisions regarding
an individual sale/production decision. Indeed, they must be ignored.
Otherwise, companies would sometimes make the wrong decision, since
they would be comparing marginal revenue to marginal cost plus a por-
tion of fixed cost.81 In cases where the marginal profit (the excess of
marginal revenue over marginal cost) is small, adding a portion of fixed
cost to the cost figure being used in the comparison might make it appear
that the company would be selling at a loss when in fact it might make a
small profit. Corporate accountants would never include fixed costs in
their determination of the profit calculation for an individual project, yet
the Commerce Department does it routinely.
Some industries are more adversely affected than others by this
questionable policy of adding fixed costs to the production cost of a par-
ticular project. For example, in high-tech industries like semiconductors,
the variable cost may constitute only twenty-five percent of the total ag-
gregate cost of production.82 Allocated fixed cost represents the other
seventy-five percent of total cost, although unit fixed cost is a meaning-
less number for decisionmaking purposes.
... [I]rrelevant future costs include fixed costs that will be unchanged by
such considerations as whether Machine X or Machine Y is selected, or
whether a special order is accepted ... Fixed costs are relevant whenever
81 CHARLEs T. HORNGREN AND GARY L. SUNDEM, INTRODUCTION TO MANAGEMENT Ac-
COUNTING 92-96 (7th ed. 1987).
82 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 130. This 25% figure was arrived at by Motorola in the Com-
merce Department's 1985-86 investigation of the semiconductor industry, Id.
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they differ under the alternatives at hand.83
Fixed costs are irrelevant in the case of sell/not sell decisions be-
cause the fixed costs will remain the same regardless of the decision
made. Only on rare occasions will fixed costs change, and therefore be-
come relevant. For example, if a company is already operating at full
capacity and could not produce even one additional unit without adding
to plant capacity, then the individual in charge of making the sell/not
sell decision would have to consider fixed costs in determining whether it
would be profitable to expand plant capacity in order to fill an additional
order.
Many other problems are also involved when an attempt is made to
allocate fixed costs. There are a number of arbitrary decisions that must
be made for any fixed cost allocation. For example, let's say that a com-
pany purchases a machine for $17,000 on September 30, 1992. The
machine is expected to last for five years, after which it can be sold for
$2,000. It is also expected to produce 10,000 units of product over its
useful life. In 1992, it actually produces 800 units. How much of the
machine's cost should be allocated to depreciation in 1992? At least six
arbitrary decisions must be made before this question can be answered.
* What will the salvage value be in five years? In this example, the
salvage value is $2,000, but that is just a guess. It is impossible to accu-
rately determine how much the machine will be worth in five years. A
new machine may make this machine obsolete well before five years
elapses, especially if the machine is a computer. Its value five years down
the road is also determined by how much the machine is used over that
timespan and how well it is maintained. If it is beat into the ground, it
will be worth less than if it is well kept and maintained. Also, the more it
is used, the more value will be lost. The machine may well fall apart long
before the five years is up.
* How long will the machine be used? The five years in this exam-
ple is an arbitrary number. There is no way to tell in advance how long
the company will use a particular machine. The company itself may no
longer be around in five years. The machine could fall apart before the
end of five years, or the company may decide to keep it for more than five
years. But the estimate has to be made and made soon because deprecia-
tion has to be reflected in each year's financial statements. If the com-
pany's accounting year ends on December 31, it must determine how
much depreciation to report within three months of purchase, since it
was acquired on September 30 in this example.
83 HORNGREN AND SUNDEM, supra note 81, at 136-37.
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* How many units will the machine crank out over its useful life?
In this example, the answer is 10,000, but that is only an estimate, a
guess that is almost totally arbitrary. Perhaps the average machine of
this sort is capable of cranking out 10,000 units of product before it falls
apart. But what if the company only gets orders for 8,000 units? If the
machine is well-maintained, it may be able to produce more than 10,000
units.
* Which depreciation method should be used to compute annual
depreciation?14 There are any number of possibilities. Someone has to
make an arbitrary decision to determine which method to use in this
particular case. Let's just take four possibilities that are commonly used
and discussed in standard accounting texts.
Straight-line Method
($17,000 - $2,000)/5 X 3/12 = $750
Depreciation for the first year using the straight-line method is $750.
Under this method, salvage value is subtracted from cost, then divided by
5 to arrive at an annual depreciation charge. But this machine was ac-
quired on September 30, so depreciation can be taken for just 3 months
in 1992 - October 1 through December 31.
Sum of the Years Digits Method
($17,000 - $2,000) X 5/15 X 3/12 = $1,250
Using this method results in a depreciation charge of $1,250. This is one
of several accelerated depreciation methods that are in keeping with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. The "15" in the denominator is
arrived at by adding 1+2+3+4+5 = 15. Depreciation of 5/15ths is
taken in the first 12 months of the asset's life. In the second 12 months,
it is 4/15ths, and so forth.
Double Declining Balance Method
$17,000 X 2/5 X 3/12 = $1,700
Depreciation using this method is $1,700. The depreciation rate used -
2/5 - is twice the straight-line rate of 1/5. Thus, the name double de-
clining balance. Salvage value is not subtracted, although the asset may
not be depreciated below salvage value.
Units of Production Method
$17,000 - $2,000) X 800/10,000 = $1,200
The depreciation allowed using this method is $1,200.
84 The depreciation chapter of any good financial accounting or intermediate accounting text
will illustrate several acceptable depreciation methods, including the ones discussed here. Taxation
texts also discuss this topic at length.
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A review of these four methods illustrates that there are at least four
possibilities (there really are many more) that may be used to determine
annual depreciation. Which method is chosen is more or less arbitrary.
Many accountants choose to use the straight-line method because it is
the easiest, even though the double declining balance method may better
reflect the decline in the asset's value.
Another problem inherent in choosing a depreciation method in-
volves how the resulting expense should be treated - as fixed or variable.
While most methods treat depreciation as a fixed cost, since the expense
is the same regardless of volume, depreciation expense can also be treated
as a variable expense, as when the units of production method is used.
The more units that are produced, the higher the depreciation expense.
Thus, depreciation is a variable rather than fixed cost in this case. So
even the decision as to whether depreciation expense should be treated as
fixed or variable is arbitrary in some cases, since the answer depends on
the depreciation method chosen.
Another arbitrary decision that must be made is when to start de-
preciating the asset. In the above example, depreciation was taken based
on when the asset was purchased. But that is not the only possibility.
Some companies take six months depreciation in the year of acquisition
regardless of when the asset is purchased. Other companies take a full
twelve months if the asset is placed in service before July 1 and take no
depreciation the first year if it is placed in service after June 30. It all
averages out, so none of these methods distorts the financial statements.
But choosing which possibility to adopt involves an arbitrary decision.
Another arbitrary decision must be made if the machine in question
produces more than one product. How should total depreciation be allo-
cated (or even computed?)? On the basis of units? Raw material cost?
Time used to make each product? Relative market value of each unit
produced multiplied by the number of units?
Another arbitrary decision that must sometimes be made is whether
depreciation should be treated as a product cost or a period cost. If it is
treated as a period cost, it is deducted at the end of the accounting pe-
riod. If treated as a product cost, it is built into the cost of the product
and deducted as part of cost of goods sold when the product is sold,
which might not be until the next accounting period.
Computing the cost of production involves many such arbitrary de-
cisions and there is no way around it.
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3. Comparing Apples To Oranges
a. Comparing Prices of Dissimilar Products
Another problem with the Department of Commerce methodology
is that it sometimes compares products that are not all that similar. For
example, an Italian company was found guilty of selling woodwind musi-
cal instrument pads for 1.16% less than fair value.8 5 The Commerce
Department computed the dumping margin by comparing the cost of
smaller pads sold in the United States with larger pads sold in Italy.
Naturally, the larger pads would cost more than the smaller pads, all
other things being equal. But that did not make any difference to the
Commerce Department. It treated the smaller pads and the larger pads
as identical for computation purposes. It explained away its position by
stating that the Commerce Department has unlimited discretion to make
or not make adjustments for differences in merchandise.86
The Commerce Department sometimes disregards the differential
quality of products when it computes its dumping margins. For exam-
ple, it has compared grade B Canadian raspberries sold in the United
States to make juice to grade A raspberries that are sold in Canada to
make jam. The grade B raspberries were harvested by machine, whereas
the grade A raspberries were harvested by hand. The cost of hand-har-
vesting is twice the cost of machine harvesting, yet the Commerce De-
partment denied any adjustment for the difference in harvesting cost, 7
and assessed a dumping duty because of a 0.002% price differential,
which amounts to less than one cent per 500 pounds of raspberries.
88
In the 1986-87 fresh flowers cases involving Colombia, 9 the Nether-
lands,90 Kenya, 91 Chile92 and Ecuador,93 the Commerce Department ba-
sically considered the price of a fresh flower in Amsterdam and the price
of a wilted flower in New York to be equivalent.94 At the end of the day,
85 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 119.
86 Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori Instrumenti Musicali v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 255
(CIT 1986), aff'd, 645 F. Supp. 956 (CIT 1986).
87 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 119-120.
88 Id. at 121.
89 See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers, supra note 59; DESLER, supra note 41, at 374.
90 See Destler, supra note 41. This Investigation was not listed in Destler as an antidumping
Investigation. However, Destler does list antidumping investigations taken against Canada, Costa
Rica, Mexico and Peru by the Floral Trade Council on May 21, 1986. Id. at 374-76. Destler does
list the Netherlands and several other countries as being on the receiving end of countervailing duty
Investigations initiated by the Floral Trade Council on May 21, 1986. Id. at 315-17.
91 See Certain Fresh Cut Flowers, supra note 59; DESrLER, supra note 41, at 375.
92 Id. at 374.
93 Id. at 375.
94 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 120.
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flower mongers were faced with the choice of either selling their rapidly
wilting flowers for whatever price they could get or throwing them away
and receiving nothing. But if they sold a wilting flower in the United
States, the price they got was compared to the price they would get for a
fresh flower sold in the country of origin.
The Commerce Department also compared the selling price of new
forklift trucks in Japan and forklift trucks in the United States that were
three years old.95
b. Comparing Prices in Dissimilar Markets
The Commerce Department sometimes compares the prices the ex-
porting company receives in the United States market to those it receives
in some third country market. Such comparisons are often made when
the exporting country does not have much of a home market for its prod-
uct. It penalized some Korean sweater companies because they sold
their sweaters in the United States market for a little less than what they
sold for in foreign markets. One company sold its sweaters for 1.20%
less in the United States than in Mexico. Another company sold for
1.11% less in the United States than in Canada. A third company was
found guilty for selling its sweaters for 0.73% less in the United States
than in the United Kingdom. 96 In arriving at its guilty verdict, the Com-
merce Department conveniently ignored several facts - like the fact that
each shipment of sweaters was a custom order, and that there were sig-
nificant differences in the sweaters the companies shipped to different
countries. It merely assumed the sweaters were identical. And, of
course, it ignored any cases where the price in the United States was
higher than the price in another country, which had the effect of under-
stating the average United States price.97
This different market comparison is especially questionable when
the product involves a nonmarket economy, 98 where prices cannot be
determined with any degree of accuracy and the exchange rate calcula-
tion involves a currency that is not recognized beyond its own borders.
For example, Polish golf carts were the subject of an antidumping inves-
tigation in 1975. 99 Whether they were being sold in the United States at
95 Id. See also Internal Combustion Forklift Trucks from Japan, USITC Pub. 2082, Inv. No.
731-TA-377 (May 1988); reported in DESrTLER, supra note 41, at 383.
96 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 121. See also Sweaters, supra note 75; DESTLER, supra note 41, at
396.
97 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 121-22.
98 See Kaplan, Kamarck and Parker, supra note 55, at 410-14 (discussing measurement
problems involved with a nonmarket economy).
99 See RICHARD POMPRET, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND
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a fair price could not be determined with reference to the prices charged
in Poland - which has no golf courses100 - or a third country because
the carts were sold only in the United States. So the investigator com-
puted what it would cost a Canadian company to make similar golf carts,
and determined that Poland was dumping its golf carts in the U.S. mar-
ket. A problem arose when the Canadian producer whose costs were be-
ing used in the computation went out of business the next year, because
no other company made golf carts that could be used for comparison
purposes with the Polish golf carts. So the investigator constructed some
costs that would have existed if a producer in another country at about
the same stage of economic development as Poland would have made
carts (Spain was chosen). It was then determined, using these new cost
calculations, that the Polish carts were not being dumped, with the result
that the earlier antidumping finding was revoked in 1980.101
The use of surrogate countries to assess "fair value" is a dubious process,
because countries at similar levels of economic development have differing
relative prices and comparative advantage. In an antidumping case against
potassium chloride imports from East Germany, the US Department of
Commerce made a preliminary assessment, based on West German prices,
of a 112 percent duty, but in the final assessment, based on Canadian prices,
a zero margin was calculated and the case dismissed. In the Polish golf cart
case the two surrogates led to opposite findings, illustrating the potentially
arbitrary outcome of antidumping cases using this approach.102
This problem is inherent in any nonmarket economy. With the
change in recent years of many nonmarket economies into market econo-
mies, one might think that this problem would be reduced. But the prob-
lem is not limited to nomarket economies. Comparing prices and costs
in one economy with those of another will always produce skewed results
because different economies have different comparative advantages.
What might be relatively inexpensive to produce in one country might be
relatively expensive to produce in another, even if the two countries are
at the same level of economic development.
Another facet of this problem emerges if you pretend you are the
POLICY 133 (1991) (construing, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del.
1978)).
100 Victor, supra note 5, at 343, construing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384
(D. Del. 1978).
101 See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, at 409-10 (D. Del. 1978). Thejudge
reasoned that, in applying the 1916 Antidumping Act [15 U.S.C. § 72], the statute requires that the
import price must be compared to some actual foreign market price in order to establish whether
dumping had occurred. Since there was no home market for the Polish golf carts and since they
were sold only in the United States, there was no foreign price to compare to the United States price.
Therefore, there could be no dumping. Id.
102 POMFRET, supra note 99, at 133.
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foreign producer and are trying to determine what price to charge in the
United States market. If you think that the Commerce Department
might compare your prices and costs to those of another country, how
can you determine which country it will choose, so you can make the
correct pricing decision? Obviously, it is impossible. Who would have
guessed that Canada (or Spain) would have been chosen as the surrogate
country in the Polish golf cart case? And even if one could guess which
country would be chosen as the surrogate, it would still be impossible to
detemine which costs the Commerce Department will choose to look at.
The mere use of this questionable surrogate test increases instability in
the international market.
Gary Horlick, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Im-
port Administration from 1981 to 1983, described the process to the Senate
Finance Committee: "I can tell horror stories about how one goes about
choosing a surrogate; it is usually done about 10 at night when one has run
out of any reasonable alternative. Just to take an example, for Chinese shop
towels we went through in order: Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and wound up with a hypotheti-
cal Chinese factory in India. It just doesn't make any sense." 10 3
With such arbitrariness, it would be very easy for Commerce De-
partment officials to choose a surrogate country that would result in the
assessment of a dumping duty. "Selection of the surrogate country pro-
vides boundless opportunity for biasing the outcome, and there is more
than a little evidence that Commerce has availed itself of this opportunity
on several occasions. ' 1°4
The Chinese manhole cover case provides an illustrative example of
how attempts by a manufacturer to comply with U.S. law can be
thwarted.10 5 In 1986, the Commerce Department computed a dumping
duty of eleven percent on Chinese manhole covers. It arrived at the
eleven percent figure by comparing Chinese manhole cover prices with
those of Belgium, Canada, France and Japan. As a result, China raised
its prices so that it would avoid future problems. But in 1990, the Com-
merce Department reviewed its work, changed its methodology and de-
cided to retroactively raise the duty to ninety-seven percent. It arrived at
this figure by comparing Chinese prices to the imaginary price that
103 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 132 (quoting Senate Comm. on Finance, Nonmarket Economy Im-
ports Legislation, 18 (May 7, 1984, Government Printing Office 1984) statement of Gary Horlick,
Deputy Asst. See. of Commerce for Import Admin.).
104 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 132 (quoting Ronald A. Cass (former I.T.C. Commissioner) and
Stephen J. Narkin, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law: The United States and the GA7',
Conference on the Commerce Department's Administration of the Trade Remedy Laws (Washing-
ton: Brookings Institution, November 29, 1990), p. 22).
105 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 133-34.
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would be charged in the Philippines. It ignored the fact that labor costs
in the Philippines are much higher than those in China. As a result of
this changed figure, Chinese companies were effectively banned from the
United States market and faced with millions of dollars in dumping
duties.
Another aspect of comparing costs in different countries is the qual-
ity or reliability of the data. In the case that Timken Company initiated
against a Hungarian manufacturer of tapered roller bearings and
parts,106 the Commerce Department chose Portugal as the surrogate
country and got its cost data on Portugal from a telephone call someone
at an American Consulate made to a Portuguese engineer, who gave an
estimate of the Portuguese production cost for steel pipes, small motors
and steel hand tools. The Embassy official also passed on the rumor he
heard that factory material overhead in Portugal was between forty to
forty-five percent and labor overhead was between thirty to thirty-three
percent.107 The final weighted average dumping margin was determined
to be 7.42%.
The same day that Timken initiated an action against Hungary, it
initiated actions against Italy,"0 8 Japan,1' 9 the People's Republic of
China,110 Romania.' and Yugoslavia.' 12 It determined the dumping
margins in each case to be: Italy, 124.75%; Japan, various, on a case-by-
case basis; People's Republic of China, 0.97%, on average; Romania,
8.7%, on average; Yugoslavia, 33.61%, on average. 1 3 The Commerce
Department got a 100% conviction rate, although its evidence was based
on questionable data.
c. Comparing U.S. Wholesale and Foreign Retail Prices
Another criticism of the Commerce Department's pricing methodol-
ogy is that it has been known to compare U.S. wholesale prices with
foreign retail prices. Such comparisons often result in the appearance of
dumping when none in fact exists. Motorola initiated an antidumping
action against Toshiba for selling cellular mobile telephones and subas-
106 Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof and Certain Housings Incorporating Tapered
Rollers from Hungary, USITC Pub. 2245, Inv. No. 731-TA-341 (Dec. 1989). Listed in DESTLER,
supra note 41, at 377.
107 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 133.
108 Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, and Certain Housings Incorporating Tapered
Rollers from Italy and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 1999, Inv. No. 731-TA-342 (Aug. 1987).
109 Investigation 731-TA-343, listed in Destler, supra note 41, at 377.
110 Investigation 731-TA-344, listed in Id. at 378.
111 Investigation 731-TA-345, listed in Id..
112 Investigation 731-TA-346, listed in Id..
113 Destler, supra note 41, at 377-78.
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semblies for less than fair value. When Toshiba sold in the Japanese
market, it sold to small local dealers directly. But when it sold in the
United States market, it sold to a single purchaser, who then resold to
distributors. But the Commerce Department did not take this fact into
account in computing the appropriate dumping duty.114
d. Disregarding Volume Discounts
It is standard practice for companies to give volume discounts for
large purchases. Yet the Commerce Department has been known to dis-
regard this fact when determining whether dumping has occurred. If a
company charges a lower price for a large sale in the United States than
for a small one in its own country, it can be found guilty of dumping. In
an antidumping action initiated by the Specialty Tubing Group,115 the
Commerce Department compared the prices a Swedish company,
Avesta, charged for small purchases of stainless steel pipe and tubing in
Sweden to those charged for large purchases in the United States. 16
More than two-thirds of the sales in Sweden were for quantities of less
than 500 kilograms. On small sales such as this, the company charged an
average of over twenty-two percent more than for sales of quantities be-
tween 501 and 5,000 kilograms. And it charged more than sixty percent
more for sales of less than 500 kilograms than for sales of over 5,000
kilograms. The company was found guilty of selling in the United States
for less than fair value. The Commerce Department's reason for disre-
garding such differences is that such adjustments are not easy to make."17
e. Classifying Costs as Direct or Indirect
The classification of costs as direct or indirect has long been a prob-
lem for accountants. For example, depreciation expense may be treated
as a direct product cost if the units of production method is used, and as
an indirect cost if the straight-line method is used. If a company has two
identical machines, one depreciated under the units of production
method and the other under the straight-line method, the depreciation
114 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 122.
115 Investigation 731-TA-354, initiated October 20, 1986, listed in DESTLER, supra note 41, at
318; see also Stainless Steel Pipes and Tubes from Sweden, USITC Pub. 1919, Inv. No. 731-TA-354
(Dec. 1986). The Specialty Tubing Group also fied a countervailing duty Investigation against
Avesta on September 4, 1986: Investigation 701-TA-281, listed in DESTLER, supra note 41, at 318.
In this Investigation, there were afflirmative preliminary injury and subsidy determinations, net sub-
sidy 1.24% ad valorem (Dec. 5, 1986); affirmative final subsidy determination, net subsidy 2.18% ad
valorem (Feb. 26, 1987); negative final injury determination (Apr. 3, 1987).
116 DESTLER, supra note 41, at 122-23.
117 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 122-23.
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for one machine will be treated as a direct cost and the other as an indi-
rect cost, even though the machines perform the exact same function.
Accountants use cost accounting techniques to make management
decisions, such as pricing, break-even points, profit margins, and so
forth. One problem, which cannot really be overcome completely, is the
problem of determining whether a particular cost is direct or indirect.
Determining whether a particular cost is direct or indirect sometimes
involves a certain amount of arbitrary decisionmaking. However, when a
particular company decides how a particular cost should be classified,
whether direct or indirect, it usually treats the cost consistently through-
out its operations. It does not treat it as direct for Department A and
indirect for Department B. Or direct in one year and indirect in the next.
This approach is in keeping with the basic accounting principles of con-
sistency and comparability.
The Commerce Department is not bound by such rules. In arriving
at a decision of whether a particular price is fair for antidumping pur-
poses, an initial determination must be made regarding which costs are
to be included in the price and which should be omitted. One criticism
that has been made of the Commerce Department's approach to this cal-
culation is that it often subtracts the sales costs a company incurs when it
computes the U.S. sales price, but includes similar sales costs when it
computes the foreign market value.118 Thus, the price in the United
States is consistently understated whenever this approach is used.
The Commerce Department often imputes a cost for various rea-
sons, such as when the cost data is not available. In one case, it imputed
the cost of carrying Brother typewriters in inventory in the United
States, but did not impute inventory carrying costs for Brother typewrit-
ers that were sold in Japan. It justified not imputing an inventory cost
for the Japanese market because it did not have any information with
which to quantify the adjustment. But it did make an inventory carrying
cost adjustment for the typewriters sold in the United States even though
it had no information on that market either.119 In another case, it sub-
tracted the cost of shipping the product to regional warehouses in the
United States from the United States price but did not subtract similar
shipping costs incurred in Japan from the Japanese price. It reasoned
that the Japanese costs were not attributable to specific sales under con-
sideration. 120 In a case initiated by American Telephone and Telegraph
118 Id at 123.
119 Id. at 123-24.
120 Id. at 124.
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Company and Comdial, Inc., 21 the Commerce Department deducted
from the United States price the cost of inland freight for Korean small
business telephone systems sold in the United States, but did not make a
reduction for similar costs incurred in Korea.1 22
The companies initiating the antidumping actions sometimes try to
convince the Commerce Department to adjust downward the United
States price in order to create or increase a dumping duty. For example,
in the suit initiated by Zenith against several Japanese television compa-
nies, Zenith tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Commerce Depart-
ment that it should subtract the Japanese companies' legal defense costs
from its U.S. selling price, thus increasing the dumping charge. In effect,
this would have resulted in making the Japanese U.S. prices increasingly
unfair as they continued to incur legal defense costs. 12 3
Another inconsistency is in the way the Commerce Department
classifies warranty costs. Foreign companies that contract out their war-
ranty costs have them classified as direct selling expenses, but companies
that provide their own warranty services have their warranty expenses
split between direct (allowable) and indirect (nonallowable) costs. Both
the Court of International Trade and the General Accounting Office
have called this practice unfair.1 24
4. Using Average Prices
Merely selling a product in the United States for the same price it
sells for at home is not sufficient to avoid a dumping charge. The Com-
merce Department can allege dumping anyway because of the way it
computes selling price. One common methodology it uses is to compute
the average foreign price over a six-month period with individual domes-
tic prices. It's another way to compare apples to oranges.
It is rare for a company to sell a particular product at the same price
in all locations at all times during a six or twelve-month period. It is far
more common to find a range of prices. But if a company sells any prod-
uct in the United States at a price that is below the average foreign price
for the period under investigation, it will give the Commerce Department
the ammunition it needs to compute a dumping margin.125 And if the
121 Investigation 731-TA-427, initiated December 28, 1988, listed in Destler, supra note 41, at
393. See also Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, USITC Pub. 2254
Inv. No. 731-TA-427 (Jan. 1990). AT&T and Comdial initiated similar Investigations against Tai-
wan (731-TA-428) and Japan (731-TA-426) the same day, listed in DESTLER, supra note 41, at 393.
122 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 124.
123 Id. at 124-25.
124 Id. at 125.
125 Id. at 120-21.
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price charged for a product is not uniform - if it varies - the chances
are that about half of the units sold will be below average in price, and
thus subject to penalty. The use of average prices to determine the exist-
ence of dumping is inherently unfair. 26
In the 1989 Tokyo Juki investigation, the Commerce Department
found that the company sold a few typewriters for less than "fair value,"
although the vast majority of typewriters were sold for more than "fair
value" (which leads to an interesting question - why would anyone buy
something for more than fair value?). The Commerce Department saw
fit to ignore the vast majority of sales that were above the minimum
(safe) price and assess a 0.0004% dumping margin on the company,
which amounts to less than a tenth of a cent difference between the price
charged for a typewriter in Japan and that charged in the United States.
Usually, the Commerce Department's band of tolerance is 0.5%, but that
figure only applies to initial investigations. Since Tokyo Juki was previ-
ously investigated for dumping, the 0.5% tolerance did not apply.' 27
The Commerce Department's average pricing method has been con-
troversial. The General Accounting Office has criticized the method be-
cause it tends to increase existing margins or create margins where none
previously existed.'28 The Court of International Trade has said that the
Commerce Department's price comparison method is not reasonably
fair. 129
When Congress amended the 1979 provision to authorize Commerce under
§ 1677f-1 to average both U.S. price and foreign market value in making
comparisons, Congress did not direct Commerce to apply a stricter set of
prerequisites when ascertaining the U.S. price. Legislative history discloses
that by extending the use of averaging with respect to the U.S. price, the
lawmakers wanted to "expand the instances in which the administering au-
thority may use sampling and averaging techniques." H.Rep. No. 725, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5127, 5172 (1984). Despite this, it appears that Commerce almost univer-
sally averages only the foreign market value. The Court questions whether
the impact of Commerce's current averaging policy relieves administrative
burden to the extent that it leads to "loss of reasonable fairness in the
results." 13
0
The method the Commerce Department uses to average prices re-
126 Wesley K. Caine makes this point in A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the
TariffAct of 1930, 13 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681, 693 (1981).
127 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 121.
128 U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921 21
(March 15, 1979), also cited in BOVARD, supra note 9, at 122, 163 n. 59.
129 NAR, S.P.A. v. United States, 707 F.Supp. 553 (CIT 1989), also cited in BOVARD, supra note
9, at 122, 163 n. 60.
130 NAR, S.P.A. v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 553, 559 (CIT 1989).
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suits in a consistent bias which tends to increase the dumping margin.
Rather than comparing average prices in the United States to average
prices in some foreign country, it compares the average foreign country
market value to the price at which each sale is made in the United States.
When sales are made at a price above fair value, it treats them as if made
at fair value and assigns a less than fair value (LTFV) amount of zero
rather than a negative value. So when it combines sales made at less than
fair value with those made at more than fair value, it skews the statistical
result in favor of a higher dumping margin. 13 1 In some cases, the result
is a dumping margin where none should exist.
D. Examples of Dumping
L Autos
The auto industry is one of the most prominent examples that can
be given where special interests (the auto industry and the auto unions)
seek the assistance of government to shelter them from the effects of for-
eign competition. The protection has taken many forms, ranging from
tariffs and quotas to allegations of dumping. One of the more recent
examples involving allegations of dumping in the auto industry is the
case of Japanese minivans. On the basis of a preliminary investigation
brought by General Motors, Ford and Chrysler t1 2 that alleged dumping
margins of between 5.4% and 30.5%,133 the International Trade Com-
mission determined that there was a reasonable indication that a U.S.
industry was materially injured because of Japanese minivans that were
allegedly sold in the United States for less than fair value. It based its
preliminary determination on the basis of the best available
information.
134
The International Trade Commission's final determination, though,
was that no domestic industry was materially injured or threatened with
material injury as a result of Japanese minivan imports,'135 although the
ITC found that more than ninety percent of the home market sales were
made at prices below the cost of production. 136 It reached its not guilty
finding by comparing U.S. sales of new minivans to fair market value
131 Knoll, supra note 2, at 278.
132 Minivans from Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 26694 (1991); reprinted in Minivans from Japan, USITC
Pub. 2402 at B-3, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 (July 1991).
133 Minivans from Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 29221 (1991); reprinted in Minivans from Japan, USITC
Pub. 2402 at B-11, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 (July 1991).
134 Investigation 731-TA-522. The preliminary findings are reported in Minivans from Japan,
USITC Pub. 2402 (July 1991).
135 Minivans from Japan, USITC Pub. 2529 at 1, Inv. No. 731-TA-522 (July 1992).
136 New Minivans from Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 21937, 21938 (1992).
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based on constructed value. The computations the ITC used to arrive at
its findings were extremely complex and, in some cases, of questionable
validity from an accounting standpoint. 137 But it is one of the few cases
where a foreign producer was found not guilty. But the case is not over
yet. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler have appealed.
Regardless of the legal outcome of the dumping case, Detroit's auto makers
believe they've already scored a victory in the market by pressuring Japa-
nese companies to boost the prices of their vehicles. "On dumping, we've
already won that one," Chrysler Chairman Lee A. Iacocca said in an inter-
view yesterday. "They [Japanese auto makers] have raised their prices
12%. ' 138
This victory snatched from the jaws of defeat means that the Big
Three automakers will feel less pressured to compete on price because the
Japanese minivan makers feel compelled to raise their prices in order to
avoid being hit with an antidumping penalty. The only loser is the
American consumer, who must now pay twelve percent more for a
Toyota minivan, or somewhat more for an American-made minivan. 139
There have been several other investigations of dumping in the auto
industry as well. For example, Southampton Coachworks, Ltd. initiated
an investigation of Canadian limousine dumping.1" The ITC found the
weighted average dumping margin to be 5.78%. Polaris Industries initi-
ated an investigation against Japanese manufacturers of all terrain vehi-
cles. While the ITC determined that the vehicles were being sold for less
than market value, no injury to an American producer was found.141
2. Steel
Foreign imports of steel and steel products have been the subject of
many dumping investigations in recent years. Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion initiated an antidumping investigation against Canadian producers
137 The adjustments the ITC made are outlined in New Minivans from Japan, 57 Fed. Reg.
21937, 21937-21958 (1992); reproduced in Minivans from Japan, USITC Pub. 2529, Inv. No. 731-
TA-522 B-5 to B-26 (July 1992).
138 Big Three Auto Firms Move to Appeal Decision on Sales of Toyota Minivans, WALL ST. I.,
August 7, 1992, at B-3.
139 The mischief of the Big Three American auto companies is not limited to the United States.
They have also been known to initiate antidumping investigations in other countries. For example,
in Canada, General Motors and Ford (but not Chrysler) caused the Canadian government to initiate
an antidumping action against the Hyundai Motor Company. Curiously, Chrysler did not join in
this petition, perhaps because at the time, it owned a 25% interest in Mitsubishi Motors, which
owned 15% of Hyundai. For more on this case, see Matthew S. Kronby, Kicking the Tires: Assessing
the HyundaiAntidumping Decision from a Consumer Welfare Perspective, 18 CANADIAN Bus. L. J.
95 (1991).
140 Investigation 731-TA-438, initiated July 24, 1989, listed in DES'rER, supra note 41, at 394.
141 Investigation 731-TA-388, initiated February 9, 1988, listed in Id. at 385.
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of new steel rail. 42 The ITC found a preliminary weighted average
dumping margin of 2.72% and a final injury and determination margin
of 38.79%.' Wyman-Gordon Corporation initiated investigations
against Brazilian, German, 144 Japanese 145 and UK 14  manufacturers of
forged steel crankshafts. The ITC found dumping margins and injury in
some cases but not in others. The dumping margins ranged from 1.9%
to 14.67%." 7 Several steel companies initiated an antidumping investi-
gation against Chinese,148 Polish 4 9 and Yugoslavian 5 ' manufacturers of
steel wire nails. A dumping margin of 6.3% was found against the Chi-
nese companies. The other two cases were withdrawn.' 5 ' Several steel
companies also initiated investigations against Polish,'52 Portuguese'53
and Venezuelan' 5 4 manufacturers of carbon steel wire rod. The prelimi-
nary investigations revealed that an American company was injured. All
three cases were later terminated.' 55 The ITC also terminated three in-
vestigations initiated by U.S. Steel Corporation against Austrian, 156
Romanian' 57 and Venezuelan 158 manufacturers of oil country tubular
goods. Numerous other examples could be given.
In one recent example, the U.S. International Trade Commission
reached a preliminary determination to continue seventy-six of the
eighty-four cases it has opened on imported flat-rolled steel. These cases
involve 6.5 million tons of steel having an annual value of almost three
billion dollars. 159 Only Taiwan has been cleared of the twenty-one coun-
tries under investigation. The cases the ITC decided to drop represented
only five percent of the imports listed in the petitions, based on tonnage
and dollar value. These cases originated on June 30, 1992, when twelve
U.S. flat-rolled steel producers filed forty-eight anti-dumping petitions
142 Investigation 731-TA-422, initiated September 26, 1988, listed in Id. at 392.
143 Investigation 731-TA-350, initiated October 9, 1986, listed in Id. at 379.
144 Investigation 731-TA-351, initiated October 9, 1986, listed in Id..
145 Investigation 731-TA-352, initiated October 9, 1986, listed in Id..
146 Investigation 731-TA-353, initiated October 9, 1986, listed in Id..
147 Id.
148 Investigation 731-TA-266, initiated June 5, 1985, listed in Id. at 363.
149 Investigation 731-TA-267, initiated June 5, 1985, listed in Id..
150 Investigation 731-TA-268, initiated June 5, 1985, listed in Id..
151 Id.
152 Investigation 731-TA-256, initiated April 8, 1985, listed in Id. at 361.
153 Investigation 731-TA-257, initiated April 8, 1985, listed in Id..
154 Investigation 731-TA-258, initiated April 8, 1985, listed in Id..
155 Id.
156 Investigation 731-TA-249, initiated February 28, 1985, listed in Id. at 360.
157 Investigation 731-TA-250, initiated February 28, 1985, listed in Id..
158 Investigation 731-TA-251, initiated February 28, 1985, listed in Id..
159 Rose Gutfeld and Dana Milbank, U.S. Steel Firms Get Early Boost In Import Fight, WALL ST.
J., August 11, 1992, at A-2.
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and thirty-six countervailing duty petitions, alleging serious and material
injury. The companies were feeling pressure from the foreign producers
partly as a result of the lapsing of voluntary restraint agreements a few
months previously,"6° and by the collapse of discussions to form a Multi-
lateral Steel Agreement. A final determination of injury could lead to
tariffs of between $600-900 million on foreign steel.
Two of the six commissioners told the steel companies that the evi-
dence presented was weak and that their cases would have to be stronger
in the future. But even though the cases of dumping are weak, they may
still be having some effect. As USX Chairman Charles Corry said:
If you're going into my hen house and stealing my eggs, and I accuse you of
that before a magistrate, probably you're not going to keep going into my
hen house tonight and next week and next week.' 1
The mere fact that a dumping action has been instigated will proba-
bly place a chilling effect on the foreign steel companies. Many of them
may decide to raise their prices just to avoid future antidumping investi-
gations, even if they are found innocent this time. The probability that
they will engage in aggressive price competition will be greatly reduced.
Even if the foreign steel producers do not raise their prices, domestic
steel prices might increase anyway. According to John Jacobson, a steel
industry consultant, these antidumping actions might reduce steel im-
ports by as much as nineteen percent, which could boost prices by five
percent to ten percent. 162
Filing of the petition is having some adverse effects on the domestic
steel industry. Although the petitioners refrained from filing petitions
against their Korean and Japanese joint venture partners, the partners
are irritated by the antidumping action. A spokesman for Korea's
Pohang Iron & Steel Company said the petitions put its California joint
venture with USX in jeopardy. As a result, hundreds or perhaps
thousands of jobs could be at stake. The filings could also lead to retalia-
tion. The Canadian government is starting to investigate retaliatory
complaints. Companies that use steel also stand to lose, since their raw
material prices are likely to increase, making them less competitive on
world markets, and possibly leading to job losses.
3. Textiles
The American textile industry is known for filing dumping petitions.
160 The Voluntary Restraint Agreements limiting imports lapsed March 31, 1992. Id.
161 Gutfeld and Milbank, supra note 159.
162 Id. Jacobson estimates that the preliminary ITC determination could shrink foreign steel
imports from the 1991 level of 16 million tons to between 13 and 14 million tons.
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The National Knitwear and Sportswear Association has filed petitions
against sweater manufacturers in Hong Kong,16 3 Korea' 64 and Tai-
wan.16 5 In all three cases dumping was found.' 66 Century Martial Arts
Supplies, Inc. filed a petition against martial arts uniform manufacturers
in Taiwan.167 The ITC found that the uniforms were being sold in the
United States for less than fair value but did not find any injury to a
domestic producer. The Headwear Institute of America initiated an in-
vestigation against sewn cloth headgear from the People's Republic of
China. 168 It was determined that the product was sold for less than mar-
ket value, although no injury to an American producer could be proven.
One major development in the textile industry in 1990 was the large
decline in the number of sweater shipments. Sweater imports fell by
more than twenty percent in volume and value - by $573 million -
based on 1989 levels.169 The decline was attributed to a soft sweater
market, a shift in fashion to other knit goods, and the antidumping peti-
tions that were filed against sweater manufacturers in Hong Kong, Tai-
wan and Korea. Sweater imports from these three countries fell
substantially - by forty-one percent in 1990 - and their share of im-
ports slid ten percentage points, to forty-four percent. But although
there have been a number of antidumping and countervailing duty ac-
tions initiated against foreign textile companies, most of the trade restric-
tions that have been placed on the textile industry have been from tariffs
and quotas rather than dumping and subsidy actions. 170
4. Agricultural Products
a. Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice
In 1986, Florida Citrus Mutual brought an antidumping action
against a Brazilian company for dumping frozen concentrated orange
juice on the American market. 17 1 The company was found guilty of
dumping it on the market for 1.96% less than fair value (the price it sold
163 Investigation 731-TA-448, initiated September 22, 1989, listed in Destler, supra note 41, at
396.
164 Investigation 731-TA-449, initiated September 22, 1989, listed in Id..
165 Investigation 731-TA-450, initiated September 22, 1989, listed in Id..
166 Idj
167 Investigation 731-TA-424, initiated November 23, 1988, listed in Id. at 393.
168 Investigation 731-TA-405, initiated May 26, 1988, listed in Id. at 389.
169 U.S. Imports of Textiles and Apparel Under the Multifiber Arrangement: Annual Report for
1990, USITC Pub. 2382, at iii (May 1991).
170 WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL 59 (re-
vised ed. 1990).
171 DESTLER, supra note 41, at 373. Dumping Investigation 731-TA-326, initiated May 9, 1986,
resolved April 22, 1987.
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for in Brazil). But what was curious is how it arrived at the 1.96% fig-
ure, since the sales price was at least forty-five percent higher in the
United States than in Brazil. In order to arrive at the unfairly low selling
price in the United States, the Commerce Department subtracted the
forty percent tariff that is imposed on orange juice, the Brazilian govern-
ment's 3.5% export tax and a few percentage points for shipping, freight
and insurance.17 2 So even though the selling price in the United States
was at least forty-five percent higher than the price in Brazil, the com-
pany was found guilty of dumping.
b. Pistachio Nuts
In 1985, the California Pistachio Commission initiated an action
against an Iranian company for selling in-shell pistachio nuts in the
United States for less than fair value. 173 The Commerce Department
computed the dumping margin to be 317%, which means that the Irani-
ans sold $4.17 worth of nuts for one dollar in the U.S. market. The only
problem was that the Commerce Department used the official Iranian
exchange rate of ninety rials to the dollar when it made its computation,
whereas the real-world exchange rate was 600 rials to the dollar. The
U.S. Court of International Trade concluded that the official rate was
irrelevant and threw out the case. 7 4
c. Kiwi Fruit
Imports of kiwifruit from New Zealand are also under attack. On
April 25, 1991, the Ad Hoc Committee for Fair Trade of the California
Kiwifruit Commission and several individual California kiwifruit grow-
ers filed a petition with the ITC,175 alleging that an industry in the
United States was materially injured or threatened with material injury
because of New Zealand fresh kiwifruit being sold for less than fair
value.176 Most of the growers who completed the ITC questionnaire said
that the large shipments of kiwifruit from New Zealand in December,
1990 caused a delay of their kiwifruit sales and resulted in lower prices
172 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 115.
173 Destler, supra note 41, at 366. Investigation No. 731-TA-287, initiated September 26, 1985,
resolved July 8, 1986.
174 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 116. I.M. Destler, in AMERICAN TRADE PoLmcs 366 (1992), lists
the average duty at 192%. N. David Palmeter also discusses this Investigation in Exchange Rates
and Antidumping Determination, 22 J. WORLD TRADE at 73-75 (1988).
175 Fresh Kiwifruit from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 2394 at 1 (June 1991).
176 Certain other domestic industries, such as those involved in the importation of kiwifruit, tend
to be helped by such imports, but the ITC does not look at this side of the coin when making its
determinations of damage.
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for kiwifruit. Sixty-four of the sixty-seven responding U.S. growers said
that they anticipated a negative impact from New Zealand kiwifruit im-
ports.17 7 In its preliminary investigation,'78 the ITC determined that
there was a reasonable indication of injury.
It arrived at its preliminary conclusion by using a constructed value
methodology.'7 9 The petitioners (Ad Hoc Committee, etc.) based their
estimates of U.S. prices on actual invoices and customer orders. They
then adjusted the U.S. price for foreign inland freight, foreign brokerage
and handling, ocean freight, marine insurance, U.S. Customs user fees,
U.S. brokerage and handling charges, U.S. inland freight, and U.S. sell-
ing expenses, such as advertising, financing, marketing and other selling
expenses.
The petitioners claimed that evidence of less than fair market value
prices was present regardless of whether U.S. prices are compared to
home market prices, third country prices or constructed value. How-
ever, they claimed that home market prices could not be used as the basis
for estimating foreign market value because:
- The home market was not viable,
- The majority of the kiwifruit sold in the home market was not of
comparable quality, and is therefore not similar to that exported to the
United States, and
- Home market sales of kiwifruit of comparable quality were made
at prices below the cost of production. 80
The petitioners also argued that third country prices should not be
used to compare to U.S. prices because they, too, are below the cost of
production. At this point, any rational individual might question how an
industry could stay in business if it sold its product at prices below the
cost of production both in the home market and abroad. One might also
ask how consumers are harmed if this is true. But such questions have no
place in an ITC investigation.
The petitioners based their dumping margin estimates on con-
structed value, which consists of the cost of production, general expenses,
packing and profit. They obtained cost of production figures from vari-
ous studies and reports published by the New Zealand Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries and the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board.
To arrive at constructed value, the petitioners added the statutory
177 Fresh Kiwifruit from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 2394 at B-9 (June 1991).
178 Id. at 1.
179 The methodology used is described in 56 Fed. Reg. 23273-23274 (1991). Reprinted in Fresh
Kiwifruit from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 2394 at B-3-4 (June, 1991).
180 56 Fed. Reg. 23273-23274 (1991).
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ten percent for selling, general and administrative expenses to the cost of
production, and an eight percent profit margin.'81 They then subtracted
packing, principal repayments and general expenses from grower costs
and added general expenses from one of the New Zealand studies because
they exceeded the statutory ten percent. They then added the eight per-
cent profit margin and the packing expenses that were deducted from the
grower costs.
On the basis of these calculations, the petitioners arrived at a dump-
ing margin of 255.02%. Some ITC adjustments whittled that margin
down to 220%. With such high dumping margins, one might wonder
how the industry could stay in business year after year. One might ques-
tion the accuracy of such a high figure. But the ITC did not question its
accuracy. It decided to move forward with its investigation.
The final investigation found that fresh kiwifruit from New Zealand
was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair
value.' 82 It determined the dumping margin to be 98.6%.183
The data upon which the grower information was based was from
the responses to questionnaires that were sent to 204 of the 572 domestic
kiwifruit growers, which were selected as a stratified random sample. 84
Packers, cold storers and handlers also received questionnaires.' 85 The
Hayward variety of kiwifruit was the only variety compared, since the
Hayward variety is the only variety that is grown on a commercial basis
worldwide. It is the kind grown both in New Zealand and California, so
the products being compared were similar, although some purchasers
who returned the ITC questionnaire indicated that the New Zealand va-
riety was often superior to the U.S. product in terms of size, shape, color
consistency and shelf life. 186
New Zealand kiwifruit represents about ninety percent of all
kiwifruit imports to the United States.'87 About 600 farmers grow
kiwifruit in California, which represents ninety-nine percent of U.S. pro-
duction. 188 About seventy-nine firms pack kiwifruit in California, and
181 It should be kept in mind that the 10% overhead charge and the 8% profit margin might have
nothing to do with reality in the kiwifruit industry, either in the U.S.A. or in New Zealand. But they
are the percentages the law allows for any industry, regardless of circumstances or location.
182 57 Fed. Reg. 13695 (1992). Reprinted in Fresh Kiwifruit from New Zealand, USITC Pub.
2510 at A-4 (May, 1992). Information for the next few paragraphs is taken either from Pub. No.
2510 or 57 Fed. Reg. 13695-13706, which is reproduced in Pub. No. 2510 at A-4-15.
183 57 Fed. Reg. 13706 (1992) and USITC Pub. 2510, at 1-3.
184 Pub. No. 2510, at 7.
185 Id. at 1-16.
186 Id. at 1-4.
187 Id. at 1-9.
188 Id. at 1-10.
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roughly fifty handlers are active in the California kiwifruit trade.13 9 It
was these three groups - growers, packers and handlers - that stood to
be injured as a result of New Zealand imports.
The methodology the ITC used in its final determination was some-
what different from that used in the preliminary investigation. For ex-
ample, it decided to use a third country market for comparison purposes,
a methodology that it rejected at the preliminary stage of the investiga-
tion. The country it chose was Japan.1" It decided to use the best infor-
mation available to determine cost of production because it did not
receive all the information it requested from New Zealand growers.
From an examination of the cost of production data, the ITC determined
that between ten percent and ninety percent of the respondent's sales
were at prices above the total cost of production.191 (The only respondent
was the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board [NZKMB]).
A number of criticisms could be made about the way in which the
dumping margin was determined. For example, NZKMB argued that
Germany, rather than Japan, should have been used as the third country
market for comparison purposes because the German market has more
in common with the United States market than does the Japanese mar-
ket. 192 It said that German sales are a closer match because they provide
more matches by time period, count size, and packing type. Further-
more, the Japanese and U.S. markets have different pricing mechanisms,
organization, and levels of development, and NZKMB does not control
sales from coolstores in Japan as it does in the USA. The market organi-
zation in Japan has a significant effect of Japanese kiwifruit prices.
NZKMB has a earlier upstream exit from the sales process in Japan,
whereas in Germany and the United States, the first unrelated sale takes
place farther downstream, after importation. Japan also has higher retail
prices, which allows it to charge a higher price to importers. The ITC
chose Japan because it was New Zealand's largest third country market.
It found that the differences between the German and Japanese markets
were not significant.
The NZKMB contended that the ITC should only compare U.S.
sales to contemporaneous Japanese sales - those within six days of the
U.S. sale, or at least within the same month or pricing period - because
kiwifruit is perishable.193 As support for its position, it cited the Mexi-
189 Id. at I-11.
190 57 Fed. Reg. 13696 (1992).
191 I at 13697.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 13699.
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can vegetable case, 194 the Canadian white potato case195 and the Norwe-
gian salmon case where the ITC compared prices for the same time
period.
The NZKMB wanted the ITC to exclude from its computations the
U.S. sales that were shipped from the Pioneer Reefer. 196 It wanted these
sales to be classified as distress sales because the fruit was in danger of
rotting and had to be sold at a deep discount. The ITC responded that,
while it had the authority to exclude aberrational sales from the compari-
son, it had no obligation to do so.
The NZKMB argued that because kiwifruit is a perishable product,
the Commerce Department should disregard sales that are below the cost
of production only if such sales exceed fifty percent of total sales vol-
ume. 197 To support its argument, it cited the Canadian potato case, in
which the fifty percent ratio was used. The Ad Hoc Committee argued
that a ten percent threshold is appropriate for kiwifruit. It supported its
position by pointing to the Mexican vegetable case, where the Commerce
Department allowed below-cost sales of up to fifty percent for products
where the sellers were unable to control output or storage, and for which
below cost selling is a normal part of operations. It pointed out that in
the Norwegian salmon case, the Commerce Department determined that
the ten percent threshold was appropriate because salmon farmers could
control the time of the sale of their output. Since kiwifruit is storable and
the NZKMB exercises control over the distribution and price of its prod-
uct, it argued that the fifty percent threshold is not appropriate in the
case of kiwifruit. The ITC decided that the ten percent threshold was
more appropriate. While it acknowledged that kiwifruit has much in
common with potatoes, it said that there is no clear rationale for depart-
ing from the ten percent threshold, and the decision to apply the fifty
percent threshold in the potato case cannot serve as a basis for decision in
the kiwi case.
The Ad Hoc Committee argued that the expenses the NZKMB in-
curred in hiring a Japanese advertising agency to conduct a survey of
Japanese consumer attitudes toward kiwifruit should not be classified as
a direct advertising expense. 198 The NZKMB said that it should be clas-
sified as a direct advertising expense The ITC categorized it as an indi-
rect selling expense.
194 45 Fed. Reg. 20512 (1980).
195 48 Fed. Reg. 51669 (1983).
196 57 Fed. Reg. 13699 (1992).
197 Id.
198 Id. at 13700.
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The Ad Hoc Committee convinced the ITC to reduce the
NZKMB's indirect selling expenses in Japan because the amount re-
ported incorrectly included corporate general and administrative ex-
penses and an amount miscategorized as unrecovered Japanese shipping
expenses, which actually were related to a shipment that was eventually
sold in the United States. 19 9 It wanted the misclassified G&A expenses
to be added to the costs that would be used in determining the cost of
production. The NZKMB had argued, unsuccessfully, that the Auck-
land office administrative expenses were allocated to the sales division,
which mostly serves the Japanese market, and should therefore be
treated as a direct cost of selling in the Japanese market. It pointed out
that similar costs were reported as an indirect selling expense for U.S.
sales. It also argued that unrecovered shipping costs were directly re-
lated to Japanese sales, since they consisted of the costs incurred for the
Pioneer Reefer, which was originally bound for Japan.
Because the NZKMB could not document a reported rebate for one
preselected sale, the Ad Hoc Committee asserted that all rebates reported
on Japanese sales should be disallowed."° The ITC agreed that all such
rebates should be disallowed. It concluded that, since the sale in ques-
tion was the only one selected for verification in which a rebate was re-
ported, the assumption must be made that the rebates were incorrectly
reported for all sales. Such an assumption is highly debatable, but there
is no appeal from the holding.
The NZKMB argued that the stratified sample the Commerce De-
partment used to compute the cost of production was not representative
or based on generally recognized sampling techniques. 0 1 It pointed out
that eighty percent of U.S. exports came from New Zealand's Bay of
Plenty region, and only farms greater than two square hectares in size are
real businesses. Anything smaller than that is a hobby farm. There also
was some miscategorization of farms by size or region in the database
that was used to make the sample selection. But it was held that the
selection was reasonable.
Some growers did not respond to the questionnaire.20 2 In other
cases, their responses could not be verified. The NZKMB argued that
these growers should not be factored into the Commerce Department's
cost of production calculation. It argued that the NZKMB had cooper-
ated in the investigation and had done its best, so the Commerce Depart-
199 ItL
200 Id
201 Id. at 13702.
202 Id.
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ment should not use adverse or punitive best information available (BIA)
for uncooperative or unverifiable growers over which it had no control,
since doing so would be unfair to the NZKMB and would further distort
the sample. The Ad Hoc Committee contended that the Commerce De-
partment must use adverse BIA, since the use of verified growers' costs
as BIA would reward the uncooperative growers. It was determined
that, based on 19 CFR 353.37, the Commerce Department is required to
use BIA when information is not reported.
Accounting for capitalized cultivation costs was another disputed
issue.20 3 The Ad Hoc Committee argued that the cost of support struc-
tures and shelter belts should be amortized over the actual useful life of
these assets, not the life of the kiwifruit vines. The NZKMB argued that
capitalized cultivation costs should be allocated over a minimum of
forty-five years, and pointed out that a properly maintained orchard has
an indefinite useful life, and capitalized cultivation costs should not be
amortized at all because the land's value has been permanently enhanced.
The Commerce Department decided that amortization should be over
twenty years, which, it determined, was the life of a kiwi vine.
Allocation of most general expenses was also debated.204 The Ad
Hoc Committee took the position that allocating most general expenses
on the basis of area is not appropriate because most of these expenses
bear no relationship to farm area. The Committee suggested that it
would be more appropriate to allocate costs based on the cost of sales.
The NZKMB contended that allocating costs on the basis of area is the
best and most reasonable method to apportion costs among different
products. The Commerce Department sided with the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee, for the most part.
With all these issues in dispute, it is easy to see that there can be
much arbitrary judgment involved in a dumping investigation. Even rea-
sonable accountants and economists might disagree on how to resolve
some of these issues. But the issues become even more complex when
one adds the confrontational dimension, as is the case with all antidump-
ing petitions. The petitioner wants to clobber the respondent and the
respondent wants to be cleared of all charges at minimal cost. The Com-
merce Department and International Trade Commission have near abso-
lute power and need not be concerned with due process because they are
exempted from the due process rules. Many Commerce Department offi-
cials consider it a goal to find a dumping margin, and this mindset biases
their judgment and leads to a finding of dumping where none exists.
203 Id. at 13703.
204 Id. at 13703-04.
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What is the likely effect of this holding on the marketplace? New
Zealand kiwifruit growers anticipate a twenty-five to thirty percent drop
in sales to the United States.205 The antidumping holding forced them to
raise their prices by twenty percent or more. Before the dumping order,
they charged fifteen to eighteen dollars for a three-tray equivalent. After
the dumping order, they are charging between $19.50 and $22.50.
New Zealand farmers are mad. They say it is unfair to force them
to sell their fruit for more than their Chilean and California competitors.
Chilean farmers are gobbling up market share in the United States by
selling their kiwifruit at prices that are far lower than any price ever
charged by New Zealand growers - between eight and twelve dollars for
a three-tray equivalent. Chilean sales of kiwifruit in 1992 are expected to
be more than 400% higher than they were in 1991. New Zealanders are
also upset because the Chileans are gaining market share without having
to spend anything to promote their product. Historically, New Zea-
landers have borne eighty percent of the worldwide cost of promoting
kiwifruit.
5. Televisions
The American television industry has often used the antidumping
laws to protect itself from foreign competition. During the 1980s, Amer-
ican manufacturers either went out of business or shifted their produc-
tion overseas. As its share of the American market diminished, what
remained of the U.S. television industry began to accuse Japanese,
Taiwanese and Korean television manufacturers of dumping their prod-
ucts on the market in violation of the antidumping laws.20 6 In one case,
a Japanese company had its dumping margin increased because it gave
some television sets to charity. The Commerce Department treated the
TVs as having a selling price of zero in the American market. Companies
also have had their dumping margins increased by selling damaged TVs
at a discount or giving their employees a discount.20 7
A classic case in this area is Matsushita v. Zenith.2"8 The facts in
this case are as follows. In 1974, Zenith and several other companies
brought an action in the federal district court,2 9 alleging that Matsu-
shita and twenty other Japanese manufacturers and/or sellers of con-
sumer electronic products had illegally conspired over a twenty-year
205 Ai Leng Choo, New Zealand Braces for Loss In Kiwi Sales, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1992, at
AIOB.
206 Note, Managing Dumping in a Global Economysupra note 5, at 506.
207 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 120.
208 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp., et al., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
209 513 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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period to drive American firms from the market by engaging in a scheme
to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television sets sold by the
Japanese companies in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain
low prices for the sets they exported and sold in the United States. The
action was brought under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
§ 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. In
holding that Matsushita and the other companies were not guilty of pred-
atory pricing, the Supreme Court stated:
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any agreement to
price below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits
that free competition would offer them. The foregone profits may be con-
sidered an investment in the future. For the investment to be rational, the
conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form
of later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.210
The court also pointed to the empirical evidence uncovered by a
number of commentators over the years, namely, that predatory pricing
conspiracies almost never occur, and when they do, they are almost
never successful. Further, the facts in Matsushita showed that the com-
pany did not drive competitors out of business and that its market share
remained about constant over the twenty-year period in question, which
made it impossible to charge monopoly prices. Even if Matsushita had
attained monopoly power, the opposition was not able to prove that en-
try barriers were high enough to prevent other competitors from entering
the market.
The Matsushita case did have some interesting effects on the market,
though. Between 1971 and 1991, the inflation-adjusted price of television
sets dropped by 25.6%.211 While American companies continued to
build large televisions that doubled as livingroom furniture, the Japanese
built the small televisions that American consumers wanted. While
American producers were investing their resources in politics and law-
suits, the Japanese were investing in better quality control and improved
technology. The American antidumping laws forced the Japanese to
raise their prices, thus adding to their profits, which played a major role
in financing their videocassette recorder production, according to the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development.212
210 475 U.S. at 588-589.
211 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 157.
212 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, CosTs AND BENEFITs OF PRO-
TECTION 159 (1985), cited in BovARD, supra note 9, at 157, 168, n. 204.
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E. Harmful Effects of Antidumping Policy
L The Chilling Effect on Competition
A strong case can be made that antidumping law, rather than pro-
moting competition, actually impedes it. The cost of entering and com-
peting in the American marketplace might be too high if the foreign
producer stands a good chance of being hit with an antidumping action.
As a result, some foreign producers rationally decide not to enter the
American market rather than face the risk of an antidumping action,
which could spawn numerous lawsuits that take years to settle.2 13 As
soon as an antidumping case is filed, customers and importers face an
unknown liability and price for an indefinite future period. Because
American importers could get hit with dumping penalties, they hesitate
to do business with a foreign supplier that has an outstanding dumping
investigation, or one that has been found guilty of dumping, because the
liability could increase and shift to them with no warning or due pro-
ess.214 The possibility of being hit with large unknown liabilities some-
where down the road also reduces importers' ability to borrow or make
new commitments. 215 The antidumping laws are exempt from the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act, which would guarantee due process. In ef-
fect, the antidumping laws punish American importers for doing business
with foreign suppliers.
Another aspect of the chilling effect that antidumping laws have on
trade is the possibility that an accused foreign supplier will have to reveal
cost of production data. While such disclosures are supposed to remain
confidential, the information foreign suppliers provide often winds up in
the hands of their American competitors.
2. Higher Prices
Antidumping policy results in higher prices for several reasons. For
one, foreign producers have a tremendous incentive to raise their prices
in order to lower the probability of being hit with an antidumping action.
Also, the chilling effect that antidumping policy has on competition re-
sults in reduced competition, and where there is reduced competition,
there are higher prices. Initiating an antidumping action allows domestic
producers to increase their own prices and profit margins. In the case of
foreign imports of antifriction bearings, for example, industry profits in-
crease by twenty million for each one percent increase in price. Tor-
213 Caine, supra note 126, at 700.
214 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 147-48.
215 Caine, supra note 126, at 701.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:491(1993)
rington Corp., which initiated the dumping action, alleged that dumping
margins were as high as fifty percent, which would have increased its
share of profits due to price increases of $250 million.216 All for the price
of a postage stamp, since Torrington did not have to pay anything to
prosecute the case. The government picked up the entire cost of
prosecution.
Another effect antidumping policy has is to weaken American com-
petitiveness. If American companies cannot get the products they want
at a reasonable cost, it raises their cost of production. Auto makers have
to pay more for steel. Company cars cost more, as do raw materials for
numerous industries. Retail clothing stores have to pay more for textile
products. As a result, profit margins are squeezed and companies make
less profit, which means they have less to invest in research, develop-
ment, expansion and job creation. Antidumping policy amounts to a
form of price control that affects hundreds of billions of dollars in im-
ports each year.
3. The Effect on Employment
The relationship between antidumping legislation and employment
might not seem obvious at first glance. However, antidumping laws do
have an effect on employment. On the positive side, a certain number of
jobs can be saved by making it difficult for foreign producers to sell in the
domestic market. If Japanese automakers, for example, had to increase
the price of their cars by $3,000, they would sell fewer cars and the big-3
domestic auto manufacturers would be able to sell more cars. And the
domestic producers would be able to raise their prices because the Japa-
nese would not be competing as aggressively on price.
However, antidumping laws also destroy jobs. Slapping on an-
tidumping duties has the same effect as slapping on a tariff or imposing
import quotas. Foreign producers that decide to sell in the American
market anyway, even in the presence of antidumping laws, will merely
raise their prices, which has the same effect on consumers as if the gov-
ernment imposed a tariff. But in the case of raising prices to avoid an-
tidumping duties, the foreign producers receive more cash, thereby
strengthening their bottom line, whereas in the case of a tariff, the gov-
ernment gets the money. So, from a domestic producer point of view,
antidumping laws are actually more harmful than a tariff because an-
tidumping laws strengthen the financial position of their foreign competi-
tors. For foreign competitors that decide to stay away from the
216 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 155.
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American market rather than risk the possibility of an antidumping ac-
tion, the effect is similar to a quota, in the sense that fewer units of prod-
uct enter the country.
Several studies have found that the number of jobs saved by impos-
ing tariffs or quotas is less than the number of jobs lost. There is a net
decrease in welfare and employment because of tariffs and quotas. Every
steel job saved costs $113,622 annually.2 17 Saving a textile job costs
$134,686 a year.218 Each dairy job saved costs $220,000 a year.2 19 Were
the money spent where it would be more productive, it is reasonable to
expect that more jobs would be created than those lost.
Some studies that have been done in this area attempt to measure
the job gains and losses. For example, imposing voluntary restraints on
the steel industry in 1984 actually destroyed more jobs than it saved -
16,900 steel production jobs saved versus 52,400 jobs lost in industries
that use steel.220 Another study estimated that the passage of a certain
trade bill would save 36,000 apparel manufacturing jobs, but destroy
58,000 apparel retailing jobs. 221
One particularly enlightening example where antidumping laws de-
stroy jobs is the case of flat panel display screens.222 In this case, the
International Trade Commission found that Japanese companies were
dumping flat panel display screens, which are used in laptop computers,
on the U.S. market.223 The ITC recommended a 62.7% dumping duty.
As a result of this ruling, American computer manufacturers were un-
able to get the flat panel displays they needed to manufacture laptop
computers. So Toshiba's production facility in Irvine, California decided
to shut down its plant and move back to Japan. Apple Computer aban-
doned plans to make laptop computers in Colorado and decided to make
them in Ireland instead. IBM said it was also considering moving its
production facilities to another country. But what is really irrational is
the fact that there were no domestic suppliers for the panel in the first
217 D. Tarr and M. Morkre, Aggregate Costs to the United States of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports,
Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (1984).
218 C.INE, supra note 170, at 194.
219 GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL,., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUD-
iEs 15 (1986).
220 ARTHUR T. DENZAU, How Import Restraints Reduce Employment, Formal Publication 80,
Center for the Study of American Business, June, 1987.
221 I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE POLITICS 56, n. 43 (1987).
222 Certain High-Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass Therefor from Ja-
pan, USITC Pub. 2413, Inv. No. 731-TA-469 (Aug. 1991).
223 This case is also discussed in Bryan T. Johnson, A Guide To Antidumping Laws: America's
Unfair Trade Practice, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 906, July 21, 1992, at 11-12.
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place. The two American companies that manufactured the screens were
both small and had the U.S. government as their only customer. Ameri-
can computer manufacturers decided not to give their business to the two
American producers because they concluded that the American suppliers
could not give them the product and service they required. So the Japa-
nese suppliers could in no way be considered to have harmed the domes-
tic industry. Yet the International Trade Commission saw fit to impose
an antidumping duty on the Japanese suppliers.
A Brookings Institution study estimated that one particular techni-
cal amendment to the 1987 trade bill would destroy 880,000 jobs in the
import portion of the wholesale and retail distribution industries.224 This
amendment, which would have artificially lowered U.S. prices by sub-
tracting selling expenses from U.S. sales prices but not from foreign sales
prices and deducting a subsidiary's profit from the U.S. sales price, would
make it appear that there was dumping where in fact there was none.
This amendment also was estimated to reduce domestic living standards
by $39 billion and increase affected import prices by twenty percent. The
chilling effect the amendment would have on direct foreign investment
also would endanger 2.7 million jobs that are provided by foreign
affiliates.
Antitrust enforcement is another area that may be compared to an-
tidumping. In both cases, the market becomes less efficient.225 To avoid
charges of predatory pricing (in antitrust) or dumping (in antidumping),
companies raise their prices, which means that the consumers of their
products have reduced standards of living. They must spend more for
the product in question, so they have less to spend on other things. One
study in the antitrust area estimated that, for every one percent increase
in enforcement, 7,000 jobs were destroyed.226
While coming up with exact numbers to measure the job gains and
224 The Brookings Institution study was conducted by Robert Lawrence and is reported by Mary
Alexander in No Dumping on Consumers, Houston Post, Nov. 24, 1987. See also Mary Alexander,
Antidumping Amendment Dumps on Consumers, Capitol Comment No. 32, Citizens for a Sound
Economy, November 5, 1987.
225 For more on the inefficiency of antitrust laws, see ROBERT H. BORK, TiE ANTrrRusr PARA-
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRuST AND Mo-
NOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE (2d ed. 1990). Basically, the argument goes like this.
The antitrust laws do not prevent monopoly, they encourage it. They reduce competition because
companies keep their prices high enough to avoid being prosecuted for predatory pricing. Antitrust
laws raise barriers to entry rather than reduce them, thus reducing competition and economic
efficiency.
226 The Shughart-Tollison study, "The Employment Consequences of Antitrust," covered the
1947-81 period. This study, in manuscript form, was cited in Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and
Antitrust, 4 CATO . 905, 914 (1985).
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losses of a particular policy may be difficult, it is not too difficult to see
that implementing a policy that results in higher prices reduces total wel-
fare and employment. If consumers have to spend an extra $3,000 for a
Japanese (or American) car, then they will have $3,000 less to spend on
something else. They will not be able to buy the motorboat they want
because they will have to spend the $3,000 on the car. What is seen is the
automobile purchase. What is not seen is the boat, which cannot be
bought - or even made - because of the policy to raise auto prices.
The company that manufactures motorboats, the retailer who sells them
and the sales person who works for the retailer all lose because the boat is
not purchased. Yet they do not even know they are losing because they
have no way of knowing that the consumer who bought the car would
have also bought a boat if only there were enough money to buy both.2 27
It is easier to identify the jobs that will be lost by a particular policy
than the jobs that will be gained by not adopting the policy because job
losses are visible. All one need do is count the number of people on the
unemployment line. Auto companies can see that adopting a certain pol-
icy will save X number of jobs in their industry, and they lobby accord-
ingly. But the people who stand to gain by rejecting a protectionist
policy aimed at saving jobs in the auto industry do not see how the policy
will affect them. The boat manufacturer and dealer do not see that they
stand to increase their sales if the protectionist auto policy is not
adopted.
Another phenomenon that has a built-in bias in favor of the protec-
tionists is the relative cost and benefit of doing anything to protect your
interests. For example, a textile manufacturer may stand to gain millions
of dollars if Congress passes a particular trade bill that might result in
raising the cost of a shirt by five dollars. It is in the textile manufac-
turer's interest to spend time, effort and money to see that such a bill
becomes law. But the individuals who wear shirts, even if they are aware
that the pending legislation will cost them five dollars a shirt, tend not to
do anything about it. For a mere five dollars, it is not worth their while
to take time off from work and travel to Washington to lobby their
elected representatives. For them, the cost exceeds the benefit. Thus,
there is a built-in bias in favor of the concentrated special interests and
against the consumers.
227 This idea is not new. Frederick Bastiat wrote about it in the mid-nineteenth century in
France. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-50 (1964).
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4. Efficiency Losses
The antidumping laws result in efficiency losses because companies
that are under attack must shift their resources from productive activities
to defensive, asset-protecting activities. Efforts shift from income pro-
ducing activities to income redistribution activities. The dozens or hun-
dreds of individuals who must compile data for the Commerce
Department cannot spend their time performing wealth creating activi-
ties. Research and development, planning and any other number of ac-
tivities must receive fewer resources, as resources are drained away for
compliance. The funds that are spent for attorneys and accountants can-
not be spent for engineering or marketing. Colombian flower growers,
for example, spent more than one million dollars just in legal fees be-
tween 1987 and 1989 to defend themselves against a charge of dumping.
Ecuadorean flower growers spent more in legal fees than the entire value
of the contested flowers they exported to the United States.228 Produc-
tivity suffers, making the company less competitive.
F. The Predatory Pricing Argument
The predatory pricing argument is an especially curious one, curious
in the sense that the economic literature of the past few decades seems to
conclude that predatory pricing either does not exist because such behav-
ior is irrational or, if it does exist, it has usually or always failed when
tried.229 James Bovard points out that, while the fear of predatory pric-
ing permeates the dumping laws and regulations, there are no known
cases in the last hundred years where a company has dumped its prod-
ucts on the U.S. market, bankrupted American producers, and then
driven up prices and squeezed consumers for a long period of time.230
Yet much of the theory upon which antidumping policy is built takes for
granted that predatory pricing both exists and is widespread. Along with
the notion that predatory pricing exists is the belief that predatory pric-
ing is somehow evil. At least one federal judge believes that dumping is
predatory and involves some element of wrong-doing.231 U.S. trade rep-
resentative Clayton Yeutter has called dumping a "predatory pricing
228 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 149.
229 For example, see Ronald H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4
ANTRusT L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1971); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Predatory Pricing, RIP, WALL ST. J., April 1, 1986, sec.
1, at 32.
230 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 157.
231 Algoma Steel Corp. Ltd. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 492
U.S. 919 (1989); BOVARD, supra note 9, at 107.
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practice condemned under U.S. law."'2 32 The evidence seems to suggest
that allowing companies to charge low prices benefits consumers without
leading to monopoly. The only ones harmed are inefficient producers
who cannot meet the competition's price. One might even go so far as to
call predatory pricing a victimless crime, in the sense that no one's rights
are violated by it.
When is pricing predatory? Perhaps never. The economic theory
underlying the prohibitions against predatory pricing is that an estab-
lished company can price its product below cost (whatever that is) until
competitors are driven from the marketplace. It can then raise its prices
above the market price because there is no competition. The strategy is
considered effective if the predatory pricer gains more after competitors
have been purged from the market than it lost in its attempt to drive
them away.
There are several problems with this argument. For one thing, a
company that prices below cost loses money on every sale. If its price is
lower than that of its competitors, it will gain market share, so every sale
it makes will push it closer to bankruptcy. Even if its price-cutting does
force all competitors from the market, the former competitors' assets
don't just vanish when they go out of business. Someone purchases the
assets at fire-sale prices, which makes the purchaser a low-cost competi-
tor. So companies that resort to predatory pricing harm themselves on
two counts: they lose money on every sale, and they help create new,
low-cost competitors. Even if the predator buys competitors' assets at
ten percent of market value, it must still worry about new competition,
which will enter the market if the predatory company's prices are high
enough. In almost no case are the barriers to entry so high that new
competitors cannot enter the market, unless some government denies a
license or prohibits entry in some other fashion.
The predatory pricing argument is especially weak when applied to
antidumping. When applied to domestic antitrust, the predatory pricing
argument might have some superficial plausibility because the domestic
market in widgets or whatever might consist of just a few competitors
that dominate the market. In the United States, for example, there are
just three major auto manufacturers, General Motors, Ford and
Chrysler. So it might be possible to argue that General Motors might
resort to predatory pricing in an attempt to drive Ford and/or Chrysler
out of business, leading to the conclusion that the antitrust laws should
prohibit such activity. While there is no evidence to support this posi-
232 Clayton Yeutter, Speech to American Association of Exporters and Importers, New York,
May 21, 1987, cited in BOVARD, supra note 9, at 156 and 168, n. 198.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:491(1993)
tion, and since such behavior would be irrational, as was pointed out
above, the predatory pricing argument, even in the case of domestic in-
dustry, is a weak one, which will not stand up to analysis.
But when the predatory pricing argument is applied to international
markets, the argument becomes even weaker. As long as trade barriers
are low or nonexistent, it is impossible to drive out all competitors and
capture the market. Even if General Motors were able to bankrupt Ford
and Chrysler, it would capture only a small portion of the domestic mar-
ket for autos. Foreign auto manufacturers like Honda, Toyota, Nissan,
Fiat, Hyundai, Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen, Volvo, and so forth, would
still maintain a strong position in the American market, unless the gov-
ernment prevented their products from entering the United States (quo-
tas) or unless it raised tariffs so high that foreign autos were priced out of
the market. The antitrust literature of the last few decades seems to con-
clude that it is impossible to achieve a monopoly position or to maintain
it without receiving protection from government against foreign competi-
tion.233 So the real threat to consumers is not that some foreign com-
pany will capture a market, but that the United States government will
assist some inefficient and high-cost domestic producer in capturing a
market that would not be possible in the absence of such support.
When one looks at the rationale behind the antidumping laws -
predatory pricing - and then looks at a list of the companies, industries,
products and countries that have been the subject of antidumping ac-
tions, the predatory pricing argument for having antidumping laws be-
comes a mockery. Oftentimes, the target of an antidumping action is
some company or product in an industry that has a very small share of
the American market. Sometimes the target is in the third-world and
poses little or no threat of bankrupting American companies. The an-
tidumping suits are invariably filed by some American company or com-
panies that want to use government as a tool to keep competitors from
chipping away at their market share.234 Below are a few examples of the
products, countries and initiators.
233 D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTrrRusT (1972); ARMENTANO, supra note 225; BORK,
supra note 225; WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREsT-GRoup POLITICS
(1990).
234 For a listing of the antidumping Investigations filed between 1979 and 1990, which includes a
listing of the product involved, the date initiated, the country involved, the initiator of the Investiga-
tion and the action taken, see DESTLER, supra note 41, at 326-403. Destler also gives a listing of
countervailing duty Investigations filed between 1979 and 1990.
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It is unlikely that the United States is about to be overrun with
Romanian carbon steel plate236 or Chinese cotton shop towels. And
fresh cut flowers hardly pose a threat, either. It would be interesting to
delve into the reasoning behind the argument to keep Iranian nuts out of
235 Id.
236 Certain Steel Products from Austria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Norway, Po-
land, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, USITC Pub. 1642, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-225-234, 731-TA-213-
217, 219, 221-226, and 228-235 (1985).
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the United States (not to be confused with nutty Iranians). And it ap-
pears that the various domestic steel producers have made a concerted
effort to bring antidumping charges against just about anyone that tries
to sell steel products in the domestic market. But can it honestly be said
that any of these foreign producers are engaged in predatory activity, or
do they just want to sell their products in the American market?
III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIDUMPING POLICY
The philosophy behind antidumping policy is a curious one. Those
who advocate antidumping policy do so for a number of reasons. Some
advocates support antidumping on the basis of fairness; they subscribe to
some variation of the "fair trade" theory, and honestly believe that there
is such a thing as fair trade, just as medieval scholars believed that there
was such a thing as a fair price. For example, when Congress was debat-
ing the merits of what was to become the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
an antidumping advocate said that antidumping laws were "vital to the
maintenance of fair trade because they deter and offset the value of pred-
atory dumping and subsidization in the United States market by foreign
governments or exporters." '237
Other advocates support antidumping because they find it useful as
a club, a threat that they can use against countries that have trade barri-
ers (perceived or real) against the importation of American products or
services. They advocate using the antidumping laws as a bargaining
chip. Another group favors antidumping laws because they see that jobs
are being lost to foreigners who sell their products at such low prices that
American companies cannot compete. Then there are the special interest
groups, the rent-seekers, who want to use the antidumping laws to in-
crease their profits and reduce the competition that is causing their com-
panies to lose sales and market share, even if it means that consumers
will have to pay higher prices for lower quality products.
On the other side of the coin are the free traders, who see antidump-
ing laws as an impediment to economic growth and/or individual free-
dom. James Bovard sees the antidumping laws as a "sword of
Damocles" that hangs over every foreign country that exports to the
United States and says that the Commerce Department views cheap for-
eign products as Trojan Horses that insidiously try to undermine the
U.S. economy.238
237 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.41, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
at 427.
238 BoVARD, supra note 9, at 107.
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A. Using the Law as a Club to Batter the Competition
The United States has imposed more antidumping penalties on low-
priced foreign goods than has any other government.239 And the rules are
so biased that nearly all the foreign companies that were investigated for
dumping between 1980 and 1989 were found guilty.24 So, as a practical
matter, it is only a matter of time between the time the petition is filed
and the foreign company is found guilty. And even if the company is
ultimately exonerated, the time, money and hassle involved in settling
the case can bankrupt a small or medium-size company, and can make
even a large company think twice about doing business in the American
marketplace. So the antidumping laws have a definite chilling effect on
foreign competitors.
Domestic companies are aware of this situation, and sometimes use
the antidumping laws to punish foreign competitors or scare them away
from the American market. It is a classic case of rent-seeking, the term
Public Choice economists use to describe situations where individuals or
special interest groups seek special privileges or protection from govern-
ment, or get someone else to pay for their benefits.241
Rent-seeking activity is likely to pop up whenever the cost is low
and the potential benefits are great. Rent-seeking activity has been com-
mon in the area of antitrust, where a private company accuses a competi-
tor of some anticompetitive practice and the government conducts the
prosecution at its own expense. If the government wins the case, the
accusing company can collect up to three times the amount of damages
that can be proven. The accuser does not have to spend anything except
the cost of a postage stamp or telephone call. The accused has to spend
years, and perhaps millions of dollars, to defend itself in court. Even if
the accused is able to win the case, its resources will be strained, and it
will be a weaker competitor for the experience. With this kind of low
downside risk and high potential gain, it is no wonder that more than
90% of all the antitrust cases filed in recent years were started by a pri-
239 U.S. General Accounting Office, Use of the GATT Antidumping Code 3-4 (1990); cited in
BOVARD, supra note 9, at 107.
240 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 108. Only 6% of the investigations the Commerce Department
conducted between 1980 and 1986 found the accused to be innocent of dumping. See James Bovard,
No Justice in Anti-Dumping, New York Times, January 28, 1990, see. 3, at 13. For a summary of the
investigations taken and the outcomes between 1979 and 1990, see DESTLER, supra note 41, at 326-
403.
241 For more on the theory of rent-seeking, see TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock eds., 1980); THE PoLrr-
ICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock
eds., 1988); GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING
(1989).
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vate company rather than the federal government. 242
The ratio of antidumping cases initiated by private parties is also
more than ninety percent of all the antidumping cases filed.243 And as is
the case with antitrust, the government pays all the costs of prosecution,
so the company that starts the proceeding does not incur any cost, but
stands much to gain if a competitor can either be bloodied by the Com-
merce Department and forced to raise its prices, or exits the U.S. market
altogether, thus reducing the competition, and the need to keep prices
low.
Nearly all of the antidumping petitions that U.S. companies file with
the Commerce Department result in an investigation - ninety-six per-
cent according to a General Accounting Office study. 2' And companies
are never penalized for submitting incorrect or knowingly false informa-
tion.245 But once a company is convicted of dumping, it can be penalized
for perhaps a decade or more, even though the dumping may have oc-
curred just once.2'
William Baumol and Janusz Ordover wrote an article a few years
ago titled "Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition."'247 Were we to
substitute the word "antidumping" for "antitrust," much of what
Baumol and Ordover said would still be true. The same is true of the
following quote:
There is a specter that haunts our antitrust institutions. Its threat is that,
far from serving as the bulwark of competition, these institutions will be-
come the most powerful instrument in the hands of those who wish to sub-
vert it. More than that, it threatens to draw great quantities of resources
into the struggle to prevent effective competition, thereby more than offset-
ting the contributions to economic efficiency promised by antitrust activi-
ties. This is a specter that may well dwarf any other source of concern
about the antitrust processes. We ignore it at our peril and would do well
to take steps to exorcise it.24 s
The antitrust laws and the antidumping laws are basically mecha-
242 D.T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 11 (1986). Based on figures
from SHUGHART, supra note 233, at 139, this figure would be around 95%.
243 Most (not all) of the antidumping investigations initiated between 1979 and 1990 are listed in
DESTLER, supra note 41, at 326-403. Only 7 of the many hundreds of Investigations he lists were
initiated by the federal government - 6 because of the trigger price mechanism for steel and one for
semiconductors - so the actual ratio of suits initiated by private companies might be close to 99%.
244 U.S. General Accounting Office, Comparison of US. and Foreign Antidumping Practices 20
(1990). The GAO statistics cover the period 1986-89, cited in Bovard, supra note 9, at 140 and 165,
n. 136.
245 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 139.
246 Id. at 140-46.
247 William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 247 (1985).
248 Id. at 247.
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nsms for wealth redistribution 
- from strong, competitive companies to
weaker, inefficient companies that want government to protect them
from the competition. Robert Bork calls this phenomenon predationthrough government processes.249 I prefer to call it using government as
a club - to batter your opponents and get what you want. William
Shughart has also written about this phenomenon at length.250
Whatever label you wish to attach to it, it is just a case where inter-
est groups lobby government for privileges. Companies, industries or
trade groups are sufficiently concentrated and have sufficient interest to
make the investment necessary to lobby government for favors. They use
government to increase their wealth at the expense of others - consum-
ers in this case - who are not mobilized to lobby government. The spe-
cial interest groups gain at the expense of the consumers, who have to
pay higher prices, and who have a reduced choice of products, since
some foreign manufacturers are driven out of the American market by
the antidumping laws. These lobbyists will continue to invest resources
into lobbying efforts as long as the return they receive is more than the
cost of their efforts.25' This phenomenon is not new, and it will persist as
long as the people who elect government officials continue to elect people
who think that this kind of activity is a legitimate function of
government.
One case in particular where using the antidumping laws as a
weapon proved to be profitable involved the investigation started by Tim-
kin against Koyo Seiko and several other Japanese tapered roller bearing
exporters.252 The Treasury Department investigated Koyo Seiko for
dumping as far back as 1969. The initial investigation, which concluded
in 1971, found no evidence of dumping. But Timkin Co., one of Koyo
Seiko's major competitors, convinced the Treasury Department to inves-
tigate Koyo Seiko and other Japanese roller bearing exporters again in
1973.253 Three years later, it found Koyo Seiko to be guilty of dumping
and imposed a 3.2% dumping penalty, although only one of its tapered
roller bearing models was found to have been sold for less than fair value,
and even that model was sold below fair value for just one month.2 54 As
a result of the investigation, Koyo Seiko adjusted its tapered roller bear-
ing prices so that it would be able to avoid future dumping penalties.
249 BORK, supra note 225, at 347-64.
250 SHUGHART, supra note 233, at 157-76.
251 Gordon Tullock discusses this point in The Welfare Costs of Taiffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J 224 (1967).
252 BOVARD, supra note 9, at 143-46.
253 Id.
254 Id.
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Between then and 1989, six different investigators at either the
Treasury Department or Commerce Department continued to work on
the Koyo Seiko case, in an attempt to find more evidence of dumping.255
Over that timespan, Koyo Seiko had to comply with more than fifty dif-
ferent requests for data. Various government officials paid visits to the
company's headquarters in Japan nine times in order to verify the data
supplied by the company. After these repeated examinations, the gov-
ernment imposed no dumping duty deposits on the company's imports,
which indicated that it could not find evidence of dumping.256
But in 1982, it was told that the investigation, which ended in 1979,
had found some dumping margins of up to two percent. Curiously, the
Commerce Department never published its findings because a Commerce
Department bureaucrat thought that it would be advisable not to make
the findings public until the Commerce Department was able to resolve
all points of contention, due to Timkin Company's intense interest in the
case.
257
A year later, in 1983, Timkin Company alleged that the sales Koyo
made in its home market were below its cost of production. Because of
that allegation, the Commerce Department demanded Koyo's cost of
production information starting as far back as 1978. Upon examining
the data, the Commerce Department could find no evidence of dumping,
and in the summer of 1985, it said that it would close the case within
forty-five days unless someone protested. As a result, Timkin protested,
and urged the Commerce Department to start another investigation of
Koyo's bearing exports as far back as 1974.258
In July, 1986, the Commerce Department announced that it would
conduct a new investigation of Koyo and said that it would issue its find-
ings within a year. But the following month, the Commerce Department
announced that it was changing its methodology and expanding its inves-
tigation to include additional bearing models. As a result, it would re-
quire much new data. However, in response to the previous
investigations, Koyo had adjusted its prices so that it could avoid future
liability for dumping under the old methodology. Because of the change
in the Commerce Department's methodology, seventeen years of experi-
ence - 1973 to 1986 - in adjusting prices to conform to Commerce
Department requirements was rendered useless. And in June, 1987, the
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panded the number of bearing models under investigation." 9
In March, 1989, the Commerce Department announced its findings.
It determined that Koyo's dumping margin for its exports for the 1974-
79 period was as high as 22.9%. It later raised that margin to 35.9%.
As a result, Koyo faced an antidumping penalty in the millions of dol-
lars, which was perhaps more than the total value of the bearings it sold
in the United States during the mid and late 1970 s."2
The means by which the Commerce Department arrived at its
dumping duty figure is especially enlightening, since it illustrates how the
system works in practice. The Commerce Department found minor dis-
crepancies among the vast quantities of data that Koyo provided - in-
formation that had been verified over and over again both by Treasury
and Commerce Department officials over the years - and used the dis-
crepancies as an excuse to reject much of the data and substituted its own
data instead based on the "best information available." It treated Koyo's
vast quantities of data as though it had never been filed. In fact, in some
cases, it appears that the Commerce Department was unaware that it had
the information it was requesting. As a result, the Commerce Depart-
ment sometimes constructed the information it needed - which involved
much guesswork - even though it already had received precise data
from Koyo.26'
To make matters worse, Koyo no longer retained much of the data
it needed to defend itself against the Commerce Department's dumping
charges. United States tax law generally requires companies to retain
financial data for just three years, and while many companies retain such
information a little longer than that, there is seldom any legitimate busi-
ness reason for keeping data much longer than five years because most
information is no longer relevant by then. So it is not surprising that
Koyo did not retain information that was as much as fifteen years old.
But even if it did retain the information, the Commerce Department ig-
nored it, for the most part, and relied on the "best information avail-
able," which, as previously discussed, often consists of highly inaccurate
information that is either taken out of thin air or from the competitor
that called for the investigation in the first place.262
To make matters worse, shortly after the Commerce Department
announced the dumping penalties, Timkin took the opportunity to in-
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attempted to get Koyo's customers to switch their business to Timkin.2 63
Using the antidumping laws as a club does not take much of an
investment on the part of the petitioning company. And the Commerce
Department is very sensitive to any allegations made by a domestic com-
pany or industry, regardless of the truth or quality of information. Ad-
ministrative reviews can be continued even after no wrongdoing is found.
All it takes is a letter from a company that might stand to be harmed by
a foreign competitor. And since the government pays for the full cost of
the investigation (by this I mean that Timken did not have to pay any-
thing, although Koyo incurred considerable expense), the present policy
encourages domestic companies to use the system to batter their competi-
tors at the expense of consumers.
B. The Ethics of Using the Antidumping Laws as a Weapon
Are there any ethical issues to be discussed in connection with using
antidumping laws as a weapon to reduce competition? I think there are,
although the literature has ignored this point. In fact, a cursory search
of the literature failed to reveal a single article that has been written
about the ethics of initiating an antidumping investigation.
The management of a company has a fiduciary duty to its sharehold-
ers. Indeed, some commentators would say that their only duty is to the
shareholders. 2 Friedman would say that the only responsibility of the
board of directors and corporate officers is to increase shareholder
wealth. But there are ethical ways to increase shareholder wealth, and
there are unethical ways. Ethical means would consist of things like act-
ing diligently and making products that consumers want in the most effi-
cient manner available. Unethical ways would consist of stealing and
putting the proceeds into the corporate checking account.
Under which category, ethical or unethical, would using the an-
tidumping laws to batter the competition fall? Clearly, using the an-
tidumping laws against a competitor tends to weaken the competitor,
which benefits the shareholders of the company that instigates the an-
tidumping action. Competitors must expend perhaps millions of dollars
to accumulate the information the Commerce Department requests,
which means that resources must be taken away from other areas, such
as research and development, product enhancement, quality control and
the search for more cost-effective ways of doing business. Rather than
263 Id.
264 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, The New York Times Magazine 33,
122-26 (September 13, 1970). Reprinted in THE ESSENCE oF FRIEDMAN 36 (Kurt R. Leube ed.,
1987).
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using their resources to create wealth, competitors that are under the
Commerce Department's microscope must expend resources merely to
protect what they already have.
There are ethical ways to batter the competition, and there are un-
ethical ways. An ethical way to batter the competition would be to sell a
better product at a lower price. An unethical way to batter the competi-
tion would be to blow out the kneecaps of the competitors' board mem-
bers. Using the antidumping laws to batter the competition is akin to
asking the government to blow out the competitors' kneecaps.
A good rule of thumb to use to determine whether conduct is ethical
would be to determine whether anyone's rights are violated, or whether
anyone's property is being taken without the consent of the owner. In
the case of antidumping laws, the company initiating the antidumping
investigation is clearly causing the competitor to expend assets in an inef-
ficient manner, to preserve resources rather than to create shareholder
wealth. If the competitor is violating some right of the company instigat-
ing the antidumping action, such action could be justified on the part of
the instigating company. But if no rights of the instigating company are
violated, then the company instigating the action is merely using the
force of government to dissipate a competitor's assets, which, in effect, is
not much different than burning down the competitor's warehouse or
destroying its property.
Are the instigating company's rights violated when a competitor
sells a product to a consumer who might otherwise buy the instigator's
product? I think not. Clearly, the instigating company is harmed, in the
sense that the competitor is causing it to lose profits. But being harmed
is not the same as having rights violated. The competitor has the right to
sell to anyone who will buy. If the instigating company uses force, or the
threat of force, to prevent the competitor from making the sale, then it is
the instigator, not the competitor, who is acting unethically. Asking the
Commerce Department to initiate an antidumping investigation against a
competitor is resorting to force or the threat of force to block a competi-
tor's right to sell, since the Commerce Department has the power to
block the competitor from entering the market, or can force the competi-
tor to pay a fee - a dumping duty - for offering consumers a product at
a better price than the instigating company.
So it appears that it is not the dumping company that is acting un-
ethically; it is the company that initiates the antidumping investigation.
Of course, "companies" cannot act unethically, any more than compa-
nies can eat, sleep, breathe or walk up stairs. Only individuals can act
ethically or unethically, so it is the individuals at the company initiating
Case To Repeal Antidumping Laws
13:491(1993)
the antidumping action who are acting unethically, not the company it-
self. The individual or individuals who do anything to move the an-
tidumping investigation forward are acting unethically, just like anyone
who takes part in the planning or torching of the competitor's warehouse
is acting unethically. Just because the damage is done with a telephone
call or letter rather than a match does not change the unethical nature of
the act.
C. Antidumping as Silliness
When looked at rationally, antidumping laws are really silly. In ef-
fect, they protect consumers from low prices. But do consumers really
need such protection? If consumers wanted higher prices, all they would
have to do is tell the sellers that their prices are too low, and the sellers
would gladly meet the consumer's needs by raising them.
But the antidumping laws have nothing to do with consumers. An-
tidumping laws are advocated by producers and are made for their bene-
fit, at the expense of consumers. In effect, the Commerce Department
works for the benefit of producers and at the expense of consumers. Pub-
lic Choice economists would say that the special interests have "cap-
tured" the Commerce Department because it is they, the special interests
(producers) who control policy.
Dumping, when it actually exists, is merely an exercise in price dis-
crimination, selling the same product in different markets at different
prices, which is rational economic behavior. It is a policy that, when
properly followed, maximizes a company's profits. Yet when it is done
across national borders, it is considered sinister or evil. Antidumping
laws reward companies that sell 100 units at an eight percent profit and
punish companies that sell one million units at a 7.9% profit. Antidump-
ing laws twist rational economic behavior by making it more attractive to
earn a higher unit profit than a higher total profit. It is better to sell
many units at a lower unit profit than a few units at a higher unit profit.
Antidumping laws reward companies for raising consumer prices.
Another aspect of price discrimination that is often overlooked by
antidumping enthusiasts is that price discrimination can actually en-
hance competition. One reason a company may engage in price discrimi-
nation is so that it can gain a foothold in a new market. It can facilitate
entry by dropping its profit margin. Another procompetitive feature of
price discrimination is that it can help to erode the cohesiveness of collu-
sive pricing arrangements.265 Yet this fact is often overlooked, perhaps
265 See RICHARD DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER at 22-23 (1980).
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because the intent of antidumping laws is to protect domestic producers,
not to enhance competition.
D. A Rights Approach To Antidumping
So far, the discussion has taken a utilitarian approach to antidump-
ing policy, for the most part. It tries to answer questions like "does an-
tidumping policy do more good than harm," or "does antidumping
policy provide the greatest good for the greatest number?" But really,
such questions are beside the point. They were addressed because econo-
mists tend to speak in terms of utilitarianism. But utilitarianism is not
the only approach that can be taken to the policy of antidumping. In-
deed, it is not even the best approach that can be taken.
Utilitarianism suffers from several weaknesses. For example, it is
impossible to measure whether the good to be gained by a particular pol-
icy exceeds the bad.266 So it is impossible to tell whether a policy would
result in the greatest good for the greatest number. Jacob Viner merely
assumes that dumping laws generally do not result in the greatest good
for the greatest number in most cases. He must make the assumption,
since there is no way to prove it mathematically. One strength of Viner's
position, though, is that he looks at both sides of the coin - consumers
as well as producers. Many commentators on the antidumping laws just
look at the effect the laws have on producers and ignore consumers.
It should not be necessary to elaborate on the proposition that a gain to the
consumer is by so much a gain to the country as a whole, and that cheap
imports are an advantage to the importing country provided the injury to
domestic industry is not as great as the gain to the consumer... From the
point of view of the importing country as a whole, there is a sound eco-
nomic case against dumping only when it is reasonable to suppose that it
will result in injury to domestic industry greater than the gain to consum-
ers. Only on the crudest of protectionist reasoning can it be argued that the
desirability of allowing the importation of dumped goods should be decided
with reference solely to its effect on domestic producers and without taking
into account its benefit to consumers. 267
Another weakness of utilitarianism is that it tends toward majoritar-
ianism. Because it cannot measure the degree of utility or disutility each
individual receives in a particular case, there is a tendency to assume out
of necessity that all individuals receive equal utility, so it then becomes a
question of how many individuals are harmed and how many are helped
by a particular policy. For example, if 50,000 steelworkers will lose their
266 For a detailed critique on the weaknesses of the utility concept, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD,
MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 260-68 (1970).
267 VINER, supra note 3, at 138.
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jobs if a particular policy is adopted but 250 million consumers will be
able to buy steel products at lower prices, the conclusion might be that
the policy should be adopted that will aid consumers even though steel
workers will lose because of the concept of the greatest good for the
greatest number. But the steelworkers lose a lot and the average con-
sumer gains only a little bit.268 While the correct policy might be
adopted, it might be adopted for the wrong reason. There is no way to
measure the extent of gain or loss in individual cases, yet these individual
gains and losses must somehow be added together to determine whether
the policy results in the greatest good for the greatest number.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the utilitarian approach is that it
sometimes disparages individual rights. When choosing the policy that
will result in the greatest good for the greatest number, it sometimes be-
comes necessary to violate someone's rights. If two wolves and one sheep
vote on what's for dinner, the wolves will win, but only at the expense of
the sheep's rights.
A property rights approach to antidumping avoids problems like
this because majoritarianism never enters into the discussion. In the case
of dumping, the question is not "who is harmed" or "who is helped."
The question is "do consenting adults have the right to trade or don't
they, and if they don't, who has the right to prevent them from doing so
and where does this authority come from"?
Being harmed is not the same as having rights violated. An Ameri-
can textile manufacturer might be harmed if Chinese or Korean textile
manufacturers are permitted to sell their products in the American mar-
ket. But it does not follow that American producers are having their
rights violated by allowing foreigners to sell in America. American pro-
ducers have a right to sell their products to anyone who is willing to buy
and so do Chinese manufacturers. The right to life, liberty and property
includes the right to sell the fruits of your labor.2 69 Preventing people
from selling the fruits of their labor is a violation of their rights. And
preventing such sales also violates the rights of anyone who might buy
the product if it were available for sale. The fact that some majority (or
the majority's elected representatives) might approve of limiting sales of
foreign products does not change the fact that rights are being violated
because rights do not come from governments or majorities, they are in-
268 In practice, it is often the group that has a lot to lose (steelworkers) that wins, at the expense
of the larger group that has a little to lose (consumers) because of the special interest effect.
269 See JOHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 26 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
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herent. That is the strength of the rights position and the weakness of
the utilitarian position.
Antidumping laws are a form of theft because they prevent individu-
als from doing with their property as they see fit. While it may not be the
property itself that is being stolen, the right to acquire, trade or dispose
of property is being hindered or prevented, in order to protect some
group that has no right to protection. Which brings us to another ques-
tion - what is the legitimate function of government?
E. Antidumping Laws and the Legitimate Functions of Government
One aspect of antidumping law and policy that is rarely discussed is
the relationship between antidumping laws and the legitimate functions
of government. Most commentators just assume that governments can
legitimately pass antidumping laws if they want to. While the scope of
this paper precludes a detailed discussion of the legitimate functions of
government, a few preliminary points should be made in order to open
up this aspect of the topic to further discussion.
Many believers in liberal democracy believe that government should
do whatever individuals cannot do for themselves. This view is wide-
spread, at least in America, and is generally not challenged. However,
reflection on this view of the legitimate functions of government would
reveal that the argument is flawed because it ignores the possibility that
some functions that cannot or would not be performed by individuals or
groups of individuals on their own should not be performed by govern-
ments either. For example, it is unlikely that private individuals would
willingly spend their own money to build multimillion dollar monuments
or subsidize the activity of some foreign government. But it does not
logically follow that government should do it just because individuals
will not voluntarily do it on their own. In fact, if there is no market
demand for building a particular monument or subsidizing a particular
activity, a strong argument can be made that that particular expenditure
should not be made because consumers have determined that the value of
funding the activity is less than the value of using the funds for some
other purpose.270
Others believe that government has no legitimate fanctions.2 7 t Still
270 Some economists call it "market failure" when the market does not provide something that
they think should be provided. For a critique of this theory, see THE THEORY OF MARKET FAIL-
URE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen, ed. 1988). A variation on the market failure theme
is the idea that some things are public goods, and that government must provide them. For a cri-
tique of the public goods argument, see DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE LIMrTS OF GOVERNMENT: AN
ESSAY ON THE PUBLIC GOODS ARGUMENT (1991).
271 Anarchists take this view. For example, see COLIN WARD, ANARCHY IN ACTION (1988).
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others believe that government should become involved to a certain ex-
tent in the redistribution of wealth.272 Utilitarians believe that the gov-
ernment should work toward the greatest good for the greatest number.
Another view on the legitimate scope of government argues that
government should be limited to the defense of life, liberty and property.
This view has been expressed by John Locke273 and, more recently, by
Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick.27 4 The Locke and Nozick views
are based on natural rights. This view of government has been referred
to as minimal government or the nightwatchman state.
Frederic Bastiat, a nineteenth century French political economist
and antiredistributionist in the broad sense of the term, expresses his
view on the legitimate scope of government as follows:
See if the law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to
other persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen
at the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do with-
out committing a crime. Then abolish this law without delay, for it is not
only an evil itself, but also it is a fertile source for further evils because it
invites reprisals. If such a law - which may be an isolated case - is not
abolished immediately, it will spread, multiply, and develop into a
system.
27 5
Based on the Bastiat definition of the legitimate scope of govern-
ment, it appears that many present-day government functions that are
taken for granted are actually illegitimate. Strictly speaking, any govern-
ment action that redistributes income would fall into this category. Un-
fortunately, the scope of this paper precludes exploring this concept in
depth.
Ludwig von Mises, the Austrian/American economist and philoso-
pher, took a different approach. He believed that a particular govern-
ment policy is good if it enhances social harmony and cooperation and
bad if it reduces such harmony and cooperation.276 His approach is
272 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For a critique of Rawls, see BRIAN BARRY,
THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973). For a critique of the ethics of redistribution, see BER-
TRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1951).
273 LocKEsupra note 269. For a discussion of the relationship between Locke's political views
and the structure of the economy, see The Second Treatise of Government and the Foundation of
Economic Society, in KAREN IVERSEN VAUGHN, JOHN LOCKE: ECONOMIST AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST
77 (1980).
274 ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). For critiques of Nozicek's views,
see READING NoziCK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Jeffrey Paul ed. 1981).
275 FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 21 (1968). Originally published in 1850 as a pamphlet, LA
Lot, reprinted in SOPHISMES ECONOMIQUES, I OEUVRES COMPLETES DE FRADARIC BASTIAT, at
343-94 (4th ed. 1878).
276 LUDWIG VON MIsEs, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 664-715 (3d. rev. ed.,
Henry Regnery Co. 1966) (1949).
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based in utilitarianism, but does not go so far as to advocate the greatest
good for the greatest number because Mises realized that majoritarianism
can sometimes be in conflict with social harmony and cooperation.
Western democracies incorporate all of these views into their gov-
ernments to a certain extent, although these views are in conflict with
each other. How do antidumping laws measure up when using any of
these viewpoints as the standard?
Antidumping laws definitely are illegitimate from the anarchist per-
spective, since all laws having less than 100% approval fail the anarchist
test. 7 However, anarchist views are not mainstream views in modem
liberal democracies, and if such ideas are discussed at all, it is only as a
benchmark with which to measure and compare other views.
Antidumping laws are redistributionist in that they transfer wealth
from consumers to producers. Consumers have to pay higher prices be-
cause of antidumping laws. Foreign producers raise their prices so that
they can avoid running afoul of the antidumping laws, and domestic pro-
ducers can get away with charging higher prices because the antidump-
ing laws reduce the downward pressure on prices that would otherwise
result if competition were more free and unrestrained. Some foreign pro-
ducers are precluded from even entering the American market, which
also reduces competition and reduces the downward pressure on prices.
But the antidumping laws do not fit the traditional redistributionist
model because the redistribution - the transfer of wealth - goes in the
other direction. Rather than going from the rich to the poor, the wealth
transfers go from consumers to producers which, in many cases, means
from the poor and middle class to the rich. So antidumping laws cannot
be justified on traditional redistributionist grounds either, because the re-
distribution goes in the wrong direction.
Antidumping laws are also outside the legitimate scope of govern-
ment from the nightwatchman state perspective because they go beyond
the mere protection of life, liberty and property. Antidumping laws actu-
ally violate property rights, since they prevent a willing buyer and a will-
ing seller from entering into a contract at a mutually agreed upon price.
Either the price must be raised in order to avoid an antidumping penalty,
or the transaction cannot take place at all because the foreign producer is
277 For a discussion of the anarchist philosophy from a Public Choice perspective, see EXPLORA-
TIONS IN THE THEORY OF ANARCHY (Gordon Tullock, ed., 1972). James M. Buchanan, the co-
founder, with Tullock, of the Public Choice School of Economics, has also written on the place of
anarchy in economic theory. For examples, see James M. Buchanan, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY:
BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975); James M. Buchanan, LIBERTY, MARKET AND
STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE 1980's (1986); James M. Buchanan, FREEDOM IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONTRACT: PERSPECTIVES OF A POLITICAL ECONOMIST (1977).
Case To Repeal Antidumping Laws
13:491(1993)
not allowed to ship goods into the domestic market. So rather than pro-
tect property rights, antidumping laws disparage them.
It is also difficult to justify antidumping laws on utilitarian grounds
- the greatest good for the greatest number - because a minority is
benefitting at the expense of the majority. While it is true that the minor-
ity benefits a lot by antidumping laws and the majority is hurt a little by
them, there is no calculus that can measure whether the benefit received
by the minority - the domestic producer - outweighs the harm done to
the majority - the consumers - who must now pay five dollars more
for a shirt or $2,000 more for an automobile.
Even the argument that saving 10,000 jobs in the textile industry is
worth having consumers pay five dollars more for a shirt does not hold
up under analysis. The studies that have been done are consistent in
finding that there is a deadweight loss, jobwise, when some protectionist
measure is allowed to distort the market. If a particular policy can save
10,000 jobs in the steelmaking industry, the policy will also destroy
15,000 or 20,000 jobs in the steel using industries.27
It seems that antidumping laws cannot pass the Misesian version of
utilitarianism either. Mises would say that a policy is good if it enhances
social harmony and cooperation. But the antidumping laws do just the
opposite. They pit producers against consumers. Rather than allowing
or assisting producers and consumers to enter into mutually beneficial
exchange, antidumping laws put barriers in the way, either by raising the
prices consumers must pay or by preventing foreign producers from en-
tering into mutually beneficial exchange with domestic consumers at all.
Antidumping laws seem to fit the Bastiat definition of legal plunder
- using the law to help you steal - which was quoted above. An-
tidumping laws benefit one person or group - a particular company or
industry - at the expense of others - consumers or foreign producers.
It would be a crime for a private individual or group of individuals to use
force to prevent a foreign company's product from crossing the border,
or to threaten to penalize a foreign producer if it did not raise prices. Yet
when government does it, it is not called a crime, it is called an an-
tidumping penalty.
Since antidumping laws cannot be justified on any theory of liberal
democracy, or on economic grounds, the logical conclusion is to abolish
them, the sooner the better. Economically, antidumping laws result in a
deadweight loss. There are more losers than gainers. Rather than being
a zero-sum game, antidumping laws are a negative-sum game. Such laws
278 For some specifics, see I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN S. ODELLu, ANTI-PROTEMCION: CHANGING
FORCES IN UNrrED STATES TRADE POLrTICS (1987); HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 219.
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reduce rather than enhance social cooperation and harmony, raise prices
and reduce the standard of living for virtually everyone. Even auto com-
panies, which benefit by having the antidumping laws applied to foreign
imports, are harmed when such laws are applied to foreign steel or any of
the many other components that go into the making of automobiles.279
While the case for outright and immediate repeal is obvious, an-
tidumping laws are not only still on the books, but are gaining in popu-
larity. More nations are enacting them each year, and those nations that
have antidumping laws are strengthening them. While the solution -
repeal - is clear, implementing it seems difficult, if not impossible.
For one thing, consumers, for the most part, do not realize that the
antidumping laws are reducing their standard of living. And even if they
did realize it, they are unorganized and unable to compete against the
special interests that have a high stake in keeping the antidumping laws
on the books. And since consumers also usually work for some com-
pany, they might also see that antidumping laws are protecting their jobs,
so they are extremely hesitant to call for their repeal. In their view, it is
better to pay five dollars more for a shirt than to lose their job and not
have the five dollars extra to spend.
Our political leadership could repeal the antidumping laws, yet they
do not, for a variety of reasons. Many of them do not realize that the
antidumping laws are a deadweight loss. They fall victim to the wide-
spread economic fallacy of what Bastiat calls "what is seen and what is
not seen."28 0 What they see is 10,000 jobs being saved if they adopt a
certain policy. What they do not see is the 20,000 jobs that will be de-
stroyed or never created if they adopt the policy. So they adopt the pol-
icy because they can see only one side of the coin.
Politicians also fall victim to the various special interest groups -
the steel industry, the steel unions, the auto industry and auto unions, the
textile industry and unions, various farm lobbies, and so forth - who
give campaign contributions or threaten to back their opponent in the
next election if they do not support this view or that. There seems to be
no easy solution to this dilemma. We must find individuals who under-
stand how the antidumping laws work and who are willing to give up
substantial time and effort to become elected so they can be in a position
to make the necessary changes. But more than just intelligence and en-
279 James M. Buchanan, Free Trade and Producer-Interest Politics, in ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY 52, 52-66 (1989).
280 See Chapter 1 of FREDERIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-50
(1964). This chapter was originally published in French in 1850. For more on this fallacy, see
HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON (1946), reprinted several times.
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ergy are required. They must convince voters that they should be
elected, which will not be easy, since many of them fear losing their jobs
if the antidumping laws are repealed. They must also be honest and able
to withstand the onslaught of the many special interest groups that are
waiting for them once they get elected. They must somehow get elected
without compromising themselves to the special interest groups that are
willing and able to give them the funding they need to get elected. How
this can be accomplished would be a good subject for another paper.
IV. CONCLUSION
After analyzing both the theory and practice of antidumping, there
is only one conclusion that can be drawn. The antidumping laws must be
repealed, the sooner the better. They serve no public interest, but merely
protect producers at the expense of everyone else. They result in a dead-
weight loss to the economy, destroy more jobs than they create and lower
living standards. Reform is not called for because the goal of antidump-
ing - protecting domestic industry at the expense of everyone else - is
not a worthy goal.
The way the antidumping laws are administered is a crime, or would
be if they were administered by anyone other than government. There is
no due process because the Administrative Procedures Act exempts the
antidumping laws from the due process requirement. The government
can ask for any amount of information it wants, relevant or otherwise,
and can demand it practically on the spot. And it can choose to ignore
any information a company or industry provides for the flimsiest of rea-
sons. It can impose penalties without recourse. Investigations can be
started easily by competitors who merely want to reduce the pressure of
competition. The charges do not have to be well-founded or even accu-
rate. The government absorbs the costs of prosecution, so the initiator
gets a free ride, at the expense of the target of the investigation and the
consumer, who must pay the price in the form of higher prices and re-
duced choice. Investigations can drag on endlessly and can be restarted
after they have been closed. The mere threat of an antidumping action
chills commerce, reduces competition and raises prices.
The antidumping laws are ambiguous and vague. Producers never
know by which standard they will be held accountable because there are
so many standards. The Commerce Department can choose to use one
standard for one case and an entirely different standard for another case
involving the same company or industry. It can decide to change stan-
dards retroactively and there is no recourse.
Many of the rules and procedures used to arrive at a conclusion of
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dumping are irrational. In order to avoid a dumping duty, a company
must have an eight percent profit, which is often higher than the profit
achieved by its domestic competitors. A foreign producer can charge the
same price as domestic producers and still be found guilty of dumping.
The way in which a fair price is arrived at is also subject to question
because of the way the Commerce Department computes it. It often
compares apples to oranges. The method by which the cost of produc-
tion is sometimes computed could result in a malpractice suit if the com-
putation were done by a certified public accountant. Cost allocations are
totally arbitrary and inconsistent from case to case. The Commerce De-
partment can choose to use the "best information available" and can to-
tally disregard better information that is provided by the target of the
investigation. The Commerce Department's methodology punishes ra-
tional economic behavior and rewards irrational behavior. It bases its
actions on outdated theories such as predatory pricing, which has been
discredited for several decades. It looks at only one side of the coin -
that of the domestic producer - and totally ignores the other side -
how the policy will affect consumers. Most importantly, from a rights
standpoint, antidumping laws prevent consenting adults from entering
into contracts at a mutually agreed upon price. The law allows produ-
cers to unethically use antidumping as a weapon to batter the competi-
tion. Antidumping laws cannot be justified by any theory of liberal
democracy. They are not utilitarian because they do not result in provid-
ing the greatest good for the greatest number. Indeed, they provide good
for the minority (producers) at the expense of the greatest number (con-
sumers). They reduce rather than enhance social cooperation and har-
mony. They violate rights. Even redistributionists would argue against
them because they redistribute income in the wrong direction - from
the poor and middle classes to the rich. There is no rational reason why
antidumping laws should exist.
